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PREFACE
The purpose of this paper, as the title states, is to show the relationship of William H. Seward to the lI'1'rent Affair".
In order for the reader to gain a true insight to this problem, he must
understand the background of the relations between Great Britain and the
United states between 1860 and 1862.

The reader must also be familiar with

the public and private life of William H. Seward up to this time.

To blend

these two ideas into the subject, it was necessary for the writer in the
introduction to mention the attempts of the Confederacy to secure their
recognition as a nation by Great Britain and France; the attempts by the
United states to prevent this recognition; and the place and attitude of
Great Britain and F'rance towards the Confederacy and United States in 1861.
In the second. chapter the author states the speeches, views, and beliefs of William H. Seward on matters which the author considered led to
a feeling of distrust of

Se~ard

by Great Brit&in.

The third chapter consists of advice to Seward from the friends of
the United States in London at tre time of the

Tren~

episode.

It was the

letters of these people which gave Seward insight and a dvice on the public
opinion and attitude of Europe, mainly Great Britain, towards the Trent
case.

This advice, together with Sev,ard's viewpoints on the seizure

helped to bring the

affair to a peaceful settlement, and thus eliminated

European military interference which might have proved disastrous to the
North in the Civil War.
-i-

ii

Chapters four, five, and six do not require explanation in the
Preface.
If, in the reader's estimation the author neglected to mention other
outstanding occurrences at the time, it was because the author felt they
were either outside the scope of the problem, or not necessary for a
proper understanding of the subject. .

...
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During the first half year of the American Civil War, the policy of
the British government toward the United States appeared to be one of un'dlinesse 1
f rl.en

In the summer of 1861, troops were sent to Canada by the

British government.

Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, re-

garded this as necessary because of what he regarded as disturbed conditions
in the United states.

The upper classes of England taken as a whole, were

decidedly hostile to the cause of the Union from a variety of motives.
Englishmen recalled that a century had not passed since the colonists of
New England had demanded for themselves the right of separating from the
Mother Countr;.l, and could not restrain a certain satisfaction at seeing
the United states in trouble;2 dislike of American business methods and
materialistic views was common, and had found expression in a novel of
Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit.

In addition, the feeling among the upper

classes in England was then in sympathy with a graded or aristocratic
state of society, and it could see this state existing in the South in

1 David Knowles, American Civil vvar, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1926, 73.
Hereafter this work will be cited as Knowles.
2 Message Of The President And Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1862, 60. Hereafter this work will be
cited as Diplorratic Correspondence, 1862.
-1-
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much the same way as in England,3 while the North had been in the habit of
employing its democratic citizenship.

For these and similar reasons, the

majority of the English governing classes found their

sYIT~athy

transformed

into enthusiasm by the early Confederate victories of the war, and by
genuine admiration for the character of the Confederate leaders. 4
In the North continued acts of unfriendliness such as the above,
seemed to indicate a strong desire for recognition of the Confederacy and
early intervention in American affairs by the British government. 5 In the
South these acts were an inspiration and renewed enthusiasm for the
Confederacy.
From the time when secession began to be contemplated by the southern
leaders, it was evident that they confidently expected foreign aid, both
moral and material, i~ their efforts to establish their independence. 6 A
comparatively large and profitable commerce had been carried on for many
years between the South and the nations of western Europe.

It seems an

exaggerated idea of the importance of this trade had impressed itself upon
the minds of the secession leaders.

They evidently believed that England

would aid than in a war for independence which would be caused by a
destruction of the cotton trade.

3 James F. Rhodes, History Of The United states From The Compromise Of
1850, Harper Brothers, New York, 1900, III, 502. Hereafter this work
will be cited as Rhodes.

4 Ibid., 502.
5 Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, University of Chicago Press,
·Chicago, 1931,13.
6 ~., 13.

Hereafter this work wlll be cited as Owsley.

3
These actions
of the British government were brought under the scrutiny
..,
of the President and the members of his Cabinet.

Secretary of State William

H. Seward addressed a circular on October 14, 1$61, to each of the governors
of

the loyal states bordering on the Atlantic Ocean or the Great Lakes.
The circular told of the attempts by the Confederacy to invoke inter-

vention by foreign powers against the United States.

It further stated that

although these attempts had failed, every precaution must be taken to insure
the safety of this country.7 Seward warned that our ports and harbors on
the seas and lakes should. be put in a condition of complete defense for "any
nation may be said to voluntarily incur danger in tempestuos seasons when it
fails to show that it has sheltered itself on every side from which the
storm might come. ,,8

He added that bec~use

Congress in its last session was

chiefly absorbed during it s extra session, with r aisingan efficient army
and navy, it did not provide as amply as could be wished for the fortification of our sea and lake coasts.

Thus, the states with the approval of

their legislature should perfect the defenses of their state at their own
expense and in his opinion would later be reimbursed by the Federal government with the consent of Congress. 9
This circular caused great comment both in Canada and England.

The

Canadian press declared that fortifications along the northern frontier of

7 Frederic Bancroft, Life of Seward, Harper Brothers, New York, 1900, II,
213. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bancroft.
8 Ibid., II, 212, quoting Seward.
9 ~., II, 212.

4
the United stat€s were a menace to their dominions, and would be immediately
equaled by defenses which they proposed to erect. 10 The London Times regarded
the circular as a menace and pronounced it l1ill-timed rt , and lIa foolish confession of fear" .11 At the time of the Tren~ seizure the London Times
again began to comment and severely criticize Seward for his circular. 12
It is interesting to notice that Seward's circular was issued three days
after the escape from Charleston of Mason and Slidell, the Confederate Commissioners to England and France.

The objects of their mission had undoubted-

ly been well understood at Washington for some time, and this probably had
something to do with the issuing of the circular.
According to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, the federal government at all times pursued a policy of the most determined and unyielding
opposition to any foreign intervention in behalf of the insurgents. 13 In
the first important despatch to William L. Dayton, the new Minister to France,
on April 22, 1861, Seward acknowledged the necessity of force to put
the rebellion.

down

With the increase of danger at home, his expressions against

foreign interference became stronger.

Vfuatever else, the President might

consent to do, he would never invoke or even "admit foreign interference

10 Charles F. Adams Jr., Charles Francis Adams, Houghton, Mifflin, New York,
1900, 225. Hereafter this work will be cited as Charles F. Adams,
Charles Francis Adams.
11 London Times, November 5, 1861,6.
12 Ibid., December 2, 1861, 6.
13 Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward, Sheldon and Company, New York, 1874,
88. Hereafter this work will be cited as Vvelles.

5
or influence iB this or any other controversy in which the government of the
United states may be engaged with any portion of the American people. 14
After indicating that he had no apprehension of unfriendly action on the
part of France, he recorded this warning to whom it may concern.
Foreign intervention would oblige us to treat those
should yield it as allies of the insurrectionary party,
and to carryon the war against them. as enemies. The case
would not be relieved, but Qn the contrary, would only be
aggravated, if several European states should combine in
that intervention. The President and the people of the
United states deem. the Union, which would then be at stake,
worth all the cost and all the sacrifices of a contest
with the wo1ld in arms, if such a contest should prove
inevitable. 5
v~ho

The Confederate convention after its organization at Montgomery in
February, 1861 adopted resolutions that stops be immediately taken to send
agents abroad for the purpose of presenting the cause of the Confederacy
to the governments of Europe.

After Jefferson Davis was installed in

office, he appointed as foreign agents William L. Yancey, of Alabama; Dudley Mann of Virginia; P. A. Rose of Louisiana; and T. Butler King of Georgia.
Early in March these men proceeded to their destination by way of New
Orleansand Havana.

They were empowered to secure the recognition of Con-

federate independence by European nations and to conclude treaties of amity

14 Messa e Of The Pres:.dent And Di lomatic Corres ondence. 1861, Government
Printing Office, Washington, 18 1, 199. Hereafter this work will be

cited as Diplomatic Correspondence. 1861, quoting Seward.

15

~.,

200, quoting Seward.

6

.
16
Yancey and Mann were to operate chiefly in Engand commerce wi.th them.
land; Rost and King in France, although other countries were to be visited.
Secretary Toombs instructed these emissaries that it was the confident
expectation of t he President of the Confederacy that the government of
Great Britain would speedily acknowledge Confederate independence and wel.
come them among the natl.ons
of t h e wor1d, 17 and that it was no""- regarded
as within the range of possibility that the seceded states could be induced
to reenter the Union.
Yancey was primarily an orator and an agitator; he was a man of fascinating manners; besides being a good representative of the slave-holding
aristocracy.1S Rost was a Frenchman by birth, and like Pierre Soule, he
ear ly gained distinction at the Louisiana bar, and became a judge of the
supreme court of that state. 19 It was expected that he could effectively
address his countrymen in their own language about their interest in the
Confederacy, and especially in talks concerning Louisiana.

liIann had much

experience in both the diplomatic and the consular service of the United
States.

It was he that was sent on a special mission to Hungary when the

Whig and the Democratic politicians pretended to be so eager to help her

16 Owsley, 52.
17 James M. Callahan, Diplomatic History Of Southern Confederacy, Johns
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1901, 109. Hereafter this work will be
cited as Callahan, Diplomatic Historz.

is

Owsley, 52.

19 lli,£., 53.

7

gain independence.
The commissioners reached London about the time that the fall of Fort
Sumter was reported.

There had been a great change in public opinion.

Eur-

ope had watched the secession spread and had seen no marked check put upon
the movement by the United states.

As Seward wrote:

"Disunion by surprise

and impetuous passion, took the first successes, and profited by them to

.

make public opinion in Europe. ,,21 Many writers have taken more pains to
formulate a grievance against Great Britain than to reach a fair understanding
of the reasons for her actions at this time.

The world knew that the seceding

states were insurrectionary, and when Northern leaders like Douglas, supported
by the official statement of the Secretary of State, said that such states
could not be subdued, Europe and especially England, believed them.

Se-

cession was so formidable and apparently so complete, that all but comparitively few Englishmen concluded that a war against it would be unsuccessful
and therefore wrong.

That such a man as Cobden shared this opinion is strong

evidence that it was an honest conviction. 2l According to Henry Adams,
"This state of public opinion was natural, and not a subject for complaint
so much as for correction. ,,22

20 .Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 51.
21 John ~orley, Life of Cobden, Chapman, London, 1881, II, 372.
this work will be cited as Morley.

Hereafter

22 Henry Adams, "English Views TowarEis The Confederacy", Historical Essays,
Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 1900, 269. Hereafter this work will be
cited as Henry Adams.

8
On July 15~ 1861 Mann and Yancey "Wrote to Toombs from Paris, their

thoughts, that all they could do was to influence public sentiment in an
unobtrusive manner until some favorable event at home should furnish an
occasion for them to press for recognition. 23 On July 15, 1861 Yancey and
Rost reported that Napoleon considered his European policy so important to
France that he would "Wait to follo"W Great Britain's lead on the American
ques t

.

~on.

24

At this time Lord Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should
be given the Southern Commissioners "When they arrived in London, but tha~
25
they be treated well.
This he thought might open Se-ward's eyes to his
folly.

Still 4'ons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so

vigorous as his language seemed to imply, and on.March 29 he wrote that
"prudent counsels" were in the ascendent, that there would be no interference
with trade at this time, and that a quieter tone was everywhere perceptible
in Washington. 26 Yet Russell was not wholly undisturbed by the reports of
Seward's quarrelsome attitude, for in a letter of April 1, 1861, he wrote
to Lyons.
I rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to
steer us through the dangers of this crisis. If it can
possibly be helped Mr. Seward must not be allowed to get

23 Robert J. Bartlett, Record Of American Diplomacl, A. A. Knopf, New York,
1947, 288. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bartlett.
24 Callahan, Diplomatic History, 119.
25 Great Britain Foreign Office, British and Foreign State Papers, Ridgway,
London, LV, 549. Hereafter this work will be cited as state Papers.
~.,

551.

us into
-. a quarrel. I shall see the Southerners when they
cOJ."ne, but not officially, ana keep them at a proper distance. 27
It is an interesting query, whether this fear thus expressed of Seward's
temper was not of distinct benefit to the United states at the moment when
the Southern Commissioners arrived in England.
be clear,

t~at

The inference would seem to

in spite of Lyons' advice to treat them well, the effect upon

28
.
Russell of Seward's attitude was to treat them coolly.

It is of course

uncertain how much Seward's threats had to do with the apparent moderation
of caution of either government.

Adams believed that Great Britain's in-

clination to enter into negotiations with the Confederates would have been
yielded to in course of time, but for the warning which came from Seward
against precipitation. 29

!lIn lieu of the former rashness has come a pro-

portionate tirddity. 1130
After spending seven months in Europe these agents accomplished nothing,
but Jefferson Davis remarked that their efforts for recognition of the Confederate States by the European

pow~rs

in 1861, served to, "make us better

known abroad, to awaken a friendly feeling in our favor, and cause a respectf'ul regard for the effort we were making to maintain the independence
of the Confederate States. 1131

27 Ibid., 554.
28 Callahan, Diplomatic History, 111.
29 Charles F. Adams, Charles E'rancis Adams, 205.
30 ill!!., 206, quoting Adams.
31 Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of Confederate Government, Appleton Company, New York, 1887, I, 469. Hereafter this work will be cited as Davis.

10
At this point it would be safe to assume that one of the chief motives
which induced the Confederate government to seek recognition abroad was a
hope that the United states would become involved in a foreign war as a con32
sequence.
If this was achieved they would then be able to form. a foreign
alliance which would have greatly aided their cause.

In addition, Confed-

erate victories during the summer and early in September strengthened the
belief of the Confederates that Great Britain and France would soon be
impressed by their military power.33
Jefferson Davis determined to try the effect of a second and more formal mission.

The new representatives were to be commissioned as ambassadors

for the Confederate States.

James M. lIlason, of Virginia, was selected to

represent the Confederate States in England, and John Slidell, of Louisiana,
was to represent the Confederacy in France.
James M. Mason had represented Virginia in the United states Senate,
and While a senator was chairman of the senate committee on foreign affairs,
and was author of the fugitive slave law. 34 He was one of the first to
advocate the secession of Virginia.
John Slidell, a native of New York, had in early life became a citizen
of Louisiana after marrying a French Creole lady.

He entered public life

in 1842, being elected to the House of Representatives. 35

32 Owsley, 85.
33 Rhodes, III, 502.
\

Callahan, Diplomatic History, 131.
~.,

131

This man repre-

11
sented

Louisi~a

the Union.

in the United States Senate when his state seceeded from

The object of the mission of Mason and Slidell to Europe was

to secure, if possible the recognition of the independence of the Confederate government by the respective states to which they were accredited;
to effect alliances or to conclude treaties of commerce or amity;36 to
procure the intervention of France and

England~

to neutralize and defeat

any diplomatic measures of the United states in Europe; to serve the financial and military needs of their government by procuring foreign loans;
securing munitions of war, granting commissions; and in short to aid the
Confederacy by every means in their power.
William H. Seward had anticipated the work of all Confederate agents
abroad and had sent to each United states minister, accredited to any
country which he thought would be applied to by these agents, a carefully
prepared letter of instructions containing an outline of the arguments to
be used in thwarting the efforts of the southern representatives.
At this point I l'Ould like to mention a few of the instructions given
to Charles Francis Adams, United states Minister to Great Britain, which
were the most careful and extended of any.

Seward thought the agents of

the Confederates would ask recognition as a measure of retaliation against
the Morrill Tariff. 37

He believed that England should not be in haste to

36 Donald Eggleston, History of Confederate War, sturgis and Walton, New
York, I, 295.

Hereafter this work will be cited as Eggleston.

37 New York Times, December 11, 1861, 2.

12

assume that

th~

Confederate States would offer more liberal facilities for

trade than the United states would be cisposed to concede.38

He also wrote

that a recognition of the Confederacy would be equivalent to a British
desire to see a prosperous nation permanently dissolved and the excuse for
so doing would be only a change in the American revenue laws which could
be only temporary because public sentiment in the United states would probably demand a change. 39 If war rather than peace should mark the existence
of the new government, there would be very strong temptations to levy an
import duty since that would be one of their chief means of raising needed
4D
revenue.
Adams was also instructed to remind the British government
that their Empire was made up of communities and possessions, some of which
were

held by ties no stronger than those which held together the Federal

Union, and the time might come when England would be put to the same test
as the Union.

IlDangerous action on their part might set a precedent and

invoke future retaliation.,,41
Additional instructions were sent to Adams by Seward to supplement
those already issued, and to keep Adams' perspective abreast with the
American attitude.

Seward hoped to persuade European nations to accept

38 Ibid. , 2.
39 Ibid. , 2.
40

~.,

2.

41 Ibid. , 2, quoting Seward.

13
his theory that the

...

~

facto sovereignty of the United states continued to

exist within the Confederacy, although the Constitution and all signs of
federal authority--except in the Post Office Department which was carried
on at the expense of the loyal people--had been superseded by Confederate
control, and although it was repeatedly announced that there was to be no
military coercion, no physical attempt to prevent the Confederacy from
perfecting its organization at home in every direction. 42

From the be-

ginning he proclaimed with confidence that the resources of the United
states would be adequate enough to meet every emergency, and that the
panic had nearly passed.

There must be no admissions of weakness in

our Constitution, nor of apprehension on the part of the government. 43
Suggestions of compromise must no be listened to, and if Great Britain
should decide to recognize the enemies of the republic, she should also
prepare to enter into an alliance with them.

Our opposition to British

interference was not to rest on the ground of any favor.

1\0

moral question,

such as slavery, that might be supposed to be at the basis of the domestic
conflict was to be brought into debate before the British government; for
it was not to be forgottin that all the states must always continue to be
equal and honored members of the Federal Union, and that their citizens
throughout all political misunderstandings and alienations "still are and
must always be one kindred and countrymen. n44 Above all the citizens of

42 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862,36.
43

lli£., 37.

44

.lli:s!., 37.

14
the United

st~tes

and of Great Britain were of common descent, language,

customs, sentiments, and religion.

The government and people of Great

Britain might mistake their commercial interests, but they could not be
indifferent to their ambition

for civilization and humanity.45

These are a few of Seward's statements that warranted the conclusions
of the London Times war correspondent, William H. Russell, that they contained an undercurrent of menace and an implication that England might
46
wish to interfere.
The United states were in fact, very weak, so far as making physical
resistance to foreign nations was concerned.

The thing best to possessing

strength was to display a confidence of possessing it; for this would be
a warning that if any power should yield to the temptation to intermeddle
its actions would be promptly resented. 47

It was absolutely necessary to

insist that the national integrity was only slightly impaired, and that
the United states would demand and extend respect.

Otherwise there could

be no likelihood of preventing an early recognition of the Confederacy.

45

Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, 4.

46 WilJ.iam H. Russell, My Diary, North am south, Harper Brothers, New
York, 1863, 70-71. Hereafter this work will be cited as 'William H.
Russell, Diary.
47 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, 43.

...
CHAPTER II
BRITISH DISTRUST OF SEWARD
The British public, as distinguished from the government, deriving its
knowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his career and past utterances,
might well consider him. as traditionally unfriendly to Great Britain.
On I<'ebruary 11, 1852 in a speech before the United states Senate,<

Seward said that the patriots of Ireland were suffering imprisonment to
restore their native land to liberty and inde)endence and this interest
was not merely personal,but that it was "reverential compassion indulged by
the people of the United States for a fallen nation. ttl

He reviewed the ten

centuries of Irish wrongs, and declared as a climax, "that never on earth
was a revolution more just or more necessary than that attempted by
William Smith O'Brien and his companion~ in exile. 1I2 Seward viewed Ireland's
misfortunes as living and crying, and England's offenses as unfortunate and
inevitable; for he concluded this portion of the argument by saying:
But, sir, on an occasion like this, Ireland is entitled to, and from me she has received her vindication.
The policy of England was the policy of the age and of
systems; and this is her sufficient apology.)

1 Congressional Globe, 1851-52, 32 Congress, I session, new series,
number 33, 525. Hereafter this work will be cited as Congressional
Globe. 1851-52.
:2 ~., 526.

Ibid., 526.

16
It is a aonservative summary of Seward's various declarations to say
that he believed it to be the duty of well-established republics to encourage and support, morally and politically at least, every rebellious
or revolutionary people striving to found a republic. 4 All the leaders
and their followers that might flee from the consequences of failure,

.

and thereby become exiles should be welcomed by the United states, and
given a portion of our public lands. 5

When discussing the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Seward characterized
Great Britain to be the foreign power that was lithe greatest, the most
grasping, and the most rapacious in the world. u6

He continued that with-

out a war on our part, Great Britain would disappear fram this hemisphere
within the next fifty years. 7
The acqUisition of Canada by the United States had long been known to
be one of Seward's favorite ideas. 8 In February of 1861, Russell became
suspicious of Seward's plans to incite a quarrel with Britain in case other
plans should fail to reunite the North and South.

It was well known that

4 Bancroft. I. 327.
5

~.,

II, 52.

6 Congressional Globe. 1855-56, 34 Congress, 1 session, new series, number
19, 290. Hereafter this work will be cited as Congressional Globe,
1855-56.

7 Ibid., 290.
Rhodes, III, 532.

17
Seward had spoken of this as a means of compensation to freedom for the
acquisition slavery had made on the South. 9 In the debate about the
fisheries in August, 1852, he said about Canada:

ItI am content to wait

for the ripened fruit which must fall. ,,10
After he returned from Labrador in 1857 he wrote a letter saying that
his previous opinion about the futuz:e of Canada was dropped as a national
conceit. fIll
I find them jealous of the United states and of Great
Britain, as they ought to be; and therefore, when I look
at their resources and extent, I know that they will be
neither conquered by the former nor permanently held by
the latter. They will be independent as they are already self-maintaining •••• 12
On several occassions both before and ·after this time, he expressed
confidence that the United states was to be the only power on this continent.
the

~

This counter-prophecy of 1857 was soon forgotten, until during
excitement it was brought .to mind and used to refute the charges

that Seward had used against Great Britain by advocating the annexation of
Canada. 13

9 William H. Seward, livorks of William H. Seward, edited by George E. Baker,
Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 1884, III, 273. Hereafter this work will
be cited as William H. Seward, Works.
10 ~., I, 273.

11 Frederick W. Seward, William H. Seward: His Life And Letters, Derby
and Miller, New York, 1891 II, 319. Hereafter this work will be cited
as Frederick W. Seward, Life and Letters.

lli,g., II, 319.
George J.vl. Trevelyan, Life of John Bright, Constable and Company, London,
1913, 318. Hereafter this work will be cited as Trevelyan.
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'William R. Seward was fortunate in having had much experience in discussing questions on foreign relations, for since 1857 he had been a member
of the United States Senate committee on foreign affairs.

Party leadership

and his fondness for showy declarations and surprising prophecies had
occasionally led him into saying unpleasant things about European monarchies.
In a public letter in 1846, he announced that the monarchies in Europe were

.

to have no rest while they had a colony remaining on this continent. 14 'When
advocating a welcome to Kossuth, he maintained that this republic forever
must be a living offence to Russia and to Austria and to despotiC powers
everywhere, and also that they will never by humiliations gain one friend
or secure one ally in Europe or America that wears a crown. 15
To the doctrine of the natural equality of men as announced in the
Declaration of Independence he added the belief that when one nation had
established a government based on that doctrine, its mission was to aid
every effort for republicanism and civil liberty in other parts of the
world. 16 He referred to Napoleon III as lithe youthful and impatient
Bonaparte, the sickly successor of the Romans. 1I17 In 1856 he mentioned
the treachery by which Louis Napoleon rose to a throne on the ruins of the

14 viilliam H. Seward, Works, III, 4L9.
15 Ibid. , I, 184.
16 Ibid. , I, 175.
17 William H. Sewarci,

~,

IV, 562.
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Republic and 1:113 pronounced the French Empire as a IIhateful usurpation. 1118
In all Seward's dreams of territorial expansion was the expectation
that they were to be realized by peaceful means, such as the quiet spread
of population and ,the growth of commerce.

In a speech of July 29, 1852,

on the IISurvey Of The Arctic and Pacific Oceans", Seward set forth his
opinions as to the duty of the nation to maritime interests and as to the
functions of ,commerce in bringing the Orient and the Occident into closer
relations. 19

He had reported from the committee on commerce a bill the

purpose of which was to cause an exploration and the making of charts of
those parts of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans traversed by our vessels engaged in whaling or in commerce with China and Japan. 20
the

He was proud of

supremacy of American whale-fishermen, for between 1750 and 1824

England paid her whalers fifteen
showed that the

mos~

million dollars in subsidies. 2l

He

profitable fishing grounds were in the neighborhood

of the Bering Straits where a large part of the exploration was to be
22
made.
He continued:
Who does not see that this movement of commerce must
effect our own complete emancipation from what remains of

18

Ibid., IV, 562.

19

Ibid., I, 236.

20

Congressional Globe, 18 51-52, number 124, 1935.

21

Ibid., 1935.

22 Ibid., 1937.

20
Eur.,ppean influence and predjudice and in turn develop the
American opinion and influence which shall remold institutions, laws, and customs in the land that is first
greeted by the rising sun? •• Whatever nation shall put
that commerce into full employment, and shall conduct it
steadily with adequate expansion, will became necessarily
the greatest of exis~~ng states; greater than any that
has ever existed ••••
Although England I s flag was to be met almost everywhere, "rooted into the
24
very earth, II
claiming supremacy in continents, and whatever is most
valuable in all the oceans, and although her commerce was advanced by the
never-tiring steam engines and by her thoughts, language, and religion,
Seward believed that the resources of the United states were abundant for
competition with her. 25
The recounting of two incidents that had occurred within a year greatly
predjudiced the minds of the British Cabinet against Seward.

In April,

1861, it vvas rumored that the Confederacy had purchased the Peerless, a
ship lying at Toronto, to be used as a commerce destroyer, and that she
was to go down the st. Lawrence River under the British flag and be delivered
to them as sea. 26

Seward demanded that Lord Lyons should take immediate

action to prevent this,27 but the British Minister explained that his
relation to Canada made compliance impossible.

Seward then declared that

23 Ibid., 1939.
24 Ibid., 1940.
25 Ibid., 1944.
26 Spencer Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, Longmans, Green, London,
1889, II, 342. Hereafter this work will be cited asvValpole.
27

Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 106.
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he would have

~he

ship seized by United states naval forces, and without

informing the British government he dispatched George Ashman to Toronto
on an official mission.

Lords Russell and Lyons inferred from this action

that Seward thought he could overaWe Great Britain. 28
solemn protests.

They entered their

Ashman was recalled; the Peerless did not go to the Con-

federates; and perhaps it was Seward's

surr~ry

action that prevented it.

The other incident concerned the Duke of Newcastle.

When the Prince

of Wales was in Albany, late in 1860, Seward remarked to the Duke of Newcastle that he was soon to be in a position where it would be his duty to
insult Great Britain, and he would proceed to do so.29

The Duke took the

remark seriously, and as Colonial Secretary reported it to his colleagues.
The newspapers soon relayed the information to the British public.

The

Newcastle conversation stuck in the British mind as indicative of probable
trouble when Seward became responsible for American foreign policy.30

Seward

might deny, as he did, that he uttered the alleged words,3l and his friend
Thurlow Weed might describe the words as ttbadinage ll , in a letter to the
2
London Times,3
but the Newcastle story continued to be material for fre-

28 Walpole, II, 343.
29

London Times, December 14, 1861, 6.

30

Ibid., 6.

31

Thurlov~

II, 378.

-iV. Barnes, Life of Thurlow Weed, Houghton, Mifflin, London, 1884,

Hereafter this work will be cited as Barnes.

32 London Times, December 14, 1861, 6.
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quent comment in the British press and also in private circles.
British Ministers would have paid little attention to Seward's speeches
and remarks intended for home consumption, had there not been suspicion of
other and more serious evidences of unfriendliness.

Lyons was an able and

well-infonned Minister, and from the first he had pictured the leadership
of Seward in the new adni.inistratioI;! at

~Vashington,

and had himself been

worried by his inability to understand what policy Seward was formulating. 33
On January 7, 1860 Lord Lyons informed Lord Russell that Seward would
be the Secretary of State and had expressed the fear that with regard to
Britain he would be a "dangerous Foreign Minister.,,34 It was felt that
Seward's voice was sure to be a powerful one. 35

On February 4, 1861, in

a letter to Russell, Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward,
in which the latter had expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble
in America was but superficial and that Union sentiment in the South would

soon prevail.

In another letter of the same date, however, Lyons asserted

that Seward was indeed likely to oe a very dangerous Secretary of State. 36
He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered to protect their
commerce, he could unite

33

by a foreign war in order to resist such

Thomas W. Newton, Lord Lyons, .l.!;dward Arnold, London, 1913, I, 30.
after this work will be cited as Newton.

34 Ibid., I, 30.
35

.~lerica

Ibid., I, 30.

36 Newton, I, 31.

Here-
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interference.~7 While himself expressing hope that a solution might be
found for the difficulties in America, Lyons warned Russell that there
were those who would solve these difficulties by a foreign war, especially
if foreign governments refused to acknowledge a United states declaration
without formal blockade closing the Southern ports. 38 Lyons exhibited
great anxiety in regard to Seward's attitude and suggested that the
best safeguard would be close union by England and France, for if these
two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade, Seward
would hardly dare to carry out 'his threat.
Lyons'

letter of February 4, 1861 called out from Russell an in-

struction in which it was repeated that advice to either party should be
withheld and a strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded
by an assertion that if the United states attempted a jingo policy toward
England, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling of
strength, but that IIblustering demonstrations ll must not be carried too far.
Russell had foreseen, the possibility of what he considered a mere jingo
policy for home effect in America.

Now however, upon the repeated expres-

sion of fears from Lyons that this might be more than words, Russell began
to instruct Lyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at
the same time desiring him to be cautious against stirring American an-

37 Ibid., I, 33.
38 Walpole, II, 317.

L
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· 39
tagonl.sm.

...

On March 20, 1861 Lyons told Seward in a confidential conversation
that if thw United States determinedto stop by force so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the cotton-growing states, he could not
answer for what might happen. 40

If a considerable rise were totake place

in the price of cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time excluded from Southern ports, an immense pressure would be put upon Britain
to use all the means in her power to open those ports. 41 On March 25,
1861, Lyons gave a dinner for Seward and other foreign diplomats, and
there Seward's violent talk about seizing any and all ships that tried to
trade with the South, even if there was no blockade, made Lyons very
anxious.42
On

April 1, 1861, Seward laid a program before the President entitled

"SoIDe Thoughts For the President's Consideration. ,,43

The first half of

the paper dealt with domestic policy and the latter part with which we are
concerned, dealt with foreign relations. 44 It must be remew~ered that

39 Newton, I, 39.
40

Ibid., I, 31.

41 Ibid., I, 3l.
42

Ibid., I, 32.

43 Thornton K. Lothrop, Willirun H. Sewarg, Houghton, Mifflin, Boston,
1899, 254. Hereafter this work will be cited as Lothrop.
44 Edward E. Hale, William H. Seward, George Jacobs and Company, Philadelphia, L10, 275. Hereafter t his work will be cited as Hale.
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three days beiore the "Thoughts" were written, the newspapers reported that
- a revolution had overthrown the Dominican Republic and had raised the flag
and proclaimed the sovereignty of Spain.

For some too it was well known

that France, Spain, and Great Britain were considering the question of
intervening in Mexico in order to stop the anarchy and violence detrimental
to their interests.

It was also rumored that a plan was developing to put

a European prince upon a Mexican throne.

The three European powers had

not yet reached any agreement; and it was unwarrantable for the United
states to assume that they intended to do more than enforce their just
claims.

As to Russia, the basis for demanding an explanation was to

be

found in the false reports in southern newspapers and in political circles
in Washington that she was about to open diplomatic relations with t he
Confederacy.

That part of Seward's paper which dealt with foreign

relations read:
I would demand explanations from Spain and ~rance,
categorically, at one.
I would seek explanations from Great Britain and
Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central
America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.
If satisfactory explanations are not received from
France and Spain.
Would convene Congress and Declare war against them.
But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an
energetic prosecution of it.
For this purpose it must be somebody's business to
pursue and direct it incessantly.
Either the President must do it himself, and be all
the while active in it, or
Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once
adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and
abide.

26
~

It is not in my especial province;
But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.45

Lincoln's rejection of this program rid this note of its dangerous features.

'1'0 further explain, it must be remembered that Seward previously

had stated that he deprecated war.

In speaking on the Hungarian ques-

tion in 1852, he said he would never counsel war except on the ground of
necessary defence. 46

As late as January 12, 1861 he stated in the

senate that there is not a nation on the earth that is not an interested
admiring friend of the United states. 47 At this time he seemingly ignored all these opinions and was zealous to do what would be most certain to make enemies of great nations and justify their combining and
attaching the United states.

Thus, he desired to stir up a foreign war

as the main-spring of his policy, itor it was the prerequisite of changing
48
the issue.
Why in our critical o::mdition, it would not have sufficed
to pick a quarrel with one foreign nation at a time does not appear,
unless it was that he was so bent on speedily having a conflict of that
kind that he sought it in several places.
Seward's theory of the unifying effect of a foreign war can be

45

John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Complete Works of Lincoln, francis
Tandy Company, New York, 1894, II, 29. Hereafter this work will
be cited as Nicolay and Hay, Works Of Lincoln.

46 William H. Seward, Works, I, 202.
47

Ibid., IV, 662.

48
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illustrated b:t, the following examples.

At the dinner of the New England

Society, he had declared that, if New York should be attached by a foreign
power nall the hills of South Carolina would pour forth their population
to the rescue. n49

In a speech of January 12, 1861 Seward declared that

during the War of 1812 Jefferson had maintained that states must be kept
within their constitutional sphere by impulsion, if they could not be
held by attraction.

50

According to Seward, Jefferson added that secession

was then held inadmissable in the face of a public enemy. 51
Seward in his own mind believed the South had stronger ties to the
federal government than to slavery, and that, if given time to reflect,
they would not go to war in the interest of that institution. 52

He also

believed that he alone could furnish and direct the policy by which the
country was to be saved.
for himself. 53

His ambition was for the Union vastly more than

He s ought power and mastery of the administration, not

because he wanted glory, but because he honestly believed that that was
the way for him to serve and save the nation.
On May

3, 1861 Lord Russell assured George M. Dallas that there was

no disposition to t ake any advantage of the unpleasant domestic trouble

49

Ibid. , IV, 649.

50

Ibid. , IV, 653.

51

Ibid. , IV, 653.

52

Lothrop, 275.

53
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in the United States; but Dallas stated that English public opinion favored
separation, and that it 'Was expected that W. H. Gregory, a member of the
House of Commons, 'Would press a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy.54 Early in May, rumors of the issuance of letters of margue
by the Confederacy, and Lincoln's declaration of a blockade, reached
London.

Russell requested Dallas to call, and informed him that the Con-

federate Commissioners 'Were in London; that although they had not yet been
seen, he 'Was not un'Willing to meet them "unofficially", and that France
and Great Britain had agreed lito take the same course as to recognition,
'Whatever that course might bell, as Dallas reported. 55 About the same time
Russell announced in the House of Commons that a British naval force
sUfficient to protect British shipping 'Was to be sent to the coast of the
United states; and that it 'Was the intention of the government to avoid
taking any part in the American contest. 56 Se'Ward became greatly excited
upon learning of the decision of Great Britain and France to act together. 57
It plainly indicated an expectation that by joint action they could safely
pursue the policy best suited to their political and commercial interests. 58
The evident assUmption 'Was that their lead 'Would be followed by other
nations, and that the United States 'Would not be able to resist such a

54 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 81-82.
55

Ibid. , 84, Dallas quoting Russell.

56 Ibid. , 84-85.
57 William H. Se'Ward,
58

~,

II, 575.
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combination

of~forces.

On May 17, 1861, Seward wrote that Great Britain was in danger of
sympathizing so much with the South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as
to drive the United states to make war with her, as the ally of the traitors-1
The long despatch of :May 21, 1861 was the result.

This despatch to Adams

began with the declaration that our relations with European powers had
reached a crisis, and that it was necessary for our government to take a
decided stand on which Itnot only its

immediate measures, but its ultimate

and permanent policy can be determined and defined. n60

Stating that the

United States was ready to meet such a war with confidence and success,
he wrote Adams that the United States after long forbearance had a right
to adopt a blockade as a means of suppressing insurrection, and that the
treatment to be administered to Confederate privateers was a matter for the
United States alone to decide. 6l He also stated that every unofficial
intercourse with the Confederates was hurtful1D the United States, and
he added that Adams should desist from all intercourse whatever, official
or unofficial, with Great Britain so "long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this country. ,,62 Because the joint action of France and Great Britain had already been
announced, but

not put into practice, Seward doubtless inferred that a

protest against it just then would be both ineffectual and unwise.

59 frederick W. Seward, Life and Letters, II, 575.
60

Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 87.

61 Ibid., 89.

Seward
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further stated... that Britain will do well to remember:
••• that in the controversy she proposes to open we shall
be actuated by neither pride, nor passion ••• ; but we will
stand simply on the principle of self-preservation, and
that our cause will involve the independence of nations
and the rights of human nature. 63
Seward's plan was that Adams should give Russell a copy of this paper and
then break off diplomatic relations with the British government, a rupture
that should last as long

as Russell continued to hold either official or

unofficial intercourse tlwith the domestic enemies of this country.1I 64 Fortunately Lincoln struck out most of the indiscreet expressions, and made
the whole despatch harmless by directing Adams to regard it as strictly
confidential.65

Lincoln here acted as Seward's quide, and was to do so

again, still more distinctly, in dealing with the Trent affair. 66
William H. Russell, the London Times correspondent, in his diary said
that the relations of the United states with ,England probably were considerably affected by Seward's failure in his prophecies as to the early suppression of thewar. 67

On July 4, 1861, Seward told Russell, the corres-

pondent, that if any European power provoked a war the United States would
not shrink from it, and had nothing to fear from a foreign war, though it
should wrap the worl in fire. 68
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68 Ibid., 131.

31
iiilliam H. Ruasell could not but admire his confidence and coolness.

Years

later, Seward admitted that he purposely made these assertions to William
H. hussell knowing that til ey would repidly reach the ears of the British
Cabinet.
Thus, the material presented in this chapter gives ample reason for
the British distrust of Seward as the time of the Trent affair approached
the scene.

...
CHAP'I'ER III

FBIZNDLY ADVICE FROM: LONDON AND PARIS

On November 27, 1861, the news of the seizure of Mason and Slidell
from the deck of the British mail ship, Trent, and the transfer of the
Confederate emissaries into

.

northern hands reached England.

More will be

said about the reaction of the British people am government in the next
chapter.

In this chapter will be emphasized the parts played by John

Bright, Richard Cobden, Thurlow Weed, and Charles r"rancis Adams in infom.ing
the United States government as to their interpretation of the reaction of
Great Britain towards the seizure; and also their views, not only on the
seizure, but as to the methods the United states should employ in settling
the. affair.

All four men were friendly to the Northern cause and their

importance exists not only from this fact, but also that they were in
London, and they were well qualified to give their views towards t he matter.
In addition the viewpoints of these four men reached the ears of ·William d.
Seward whose duty it was to guide the desting of the United states in
foreign matters.

The first person to be considered will be John Bright.

By 1860 John Bright alone had shouldered the work to carry a real reform bill through Parliament.

The hatred for him in England became so in-

tense that before the reform fight was finished Lord Russell was censured
for even inviting him to dinner.

In America he was the object of great

-32-

33
admiration, and was urged to visit t his country.

Although he never came

to the United states, he was probably one of the few English statesmen that
had working knowledge of it.

He sympathized with the struggle a democracy

in the United States,l and he set out to give his countrymen a similar
share in their government.

As Barry O'Brien states:

Bright had no faith in aristocratic institutions.
He believed in government broadly based upon the people's
will; and it was to secure 'such a government that he
advocated the cause of Parliamentary Reform •••• It was
Bright's policy to reform the system, and practically
to transfer the government of the country from the
privileged classes to the ma.sses of the people. 2
John Bright took a very conservative view of the Trent case.

At a

public dinner given at Rochdale on December 4, 1861, Bright made a speech
in which he said that he did not endorse the seizure of the Southern
commissioners, but believed that it was an unauthorized act for which
sufficient reparation would be made. 3 He thought that the United states
had evinced a great desire to be guided by wise and moderate consels in
the construction of cases under the maritliue law.

It had been asserted,

Bright believed, that that this was one of a series of acts showing illwill on the })art of the North, but he believed that irritating accidents
were unavoidable in a struggle like the present one and advised his
countrymen to be calm.

The noted pacifist reminded his fellow Englishmen

1 Leonard V. Roth, IIJohn Bright and The American Civil War II , Old South
Leaflets, IX, Number 2, 3. Hereafter this work will be cited as Roth.
2 Barry O'Brien, John Bright, A Monograph, Smith, Elder, London, 1910,
177. Hereafter this work will be cited as O'Brien.
3 John Bright, A Friendly Voice It'rom England On American Affairs, pamphlet,

3.
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how they were ..dragged into the Crimean War, and suffered the ensuing penalties of men, money, loss of trade, and the increased costs of European
armaments. 4

He then reminded the meeting that large number of English

people had recently emigrated to the Northern states, and that

~ople

bound by such close ties could only be invloved in war by misrepresentation,
and the most gross and wicked calumny.5

In conclusion Bright prayed that

in the future it might not be said by the "millions of freemen in the
North that in their darkest hour of need the English people, from whom
they sprung, had looked on with icy coldness on the t rials and sufferings
of their terrible struggle. 1I6

This speech was the clearest note of battle

for the North that had been sounded in England by an Englishmen. 7
His letters to Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had much effect on American foreign policy, especially
at the time of the Trent affair. 8

On December

5, 1861, John Bright wrote

a letter to Sumner in which he stated that i f he were President of the
United States, he would write a complete and capable answer to the case
which would be written in a courteous and friendly tone, and then send
this note

to London. 9 If this note would not be accepted, then the

matter would be referred to an arbitration group consisting of European

4 Ibid. , 4.
5 Ibid. , 7
6 Ibid. ,

14.

7 Trevelyan, 313.
8
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government s.

10

... Bright firmly believed that if the seizure was not author-

ized by the United states, the difficulty would be smaller. l l

He firmly

hoped that the Unit ed states would act firmly and courteously.

At this

time, there wastalk in a British Cabinet meeting that the Trent seizure
was arranged by kason, Slidell, Wilkes, and certain members of the United
states government far the purpose of causing war between the United States
and England.

12

On December

7,

1861, Bright wrote to Sumner his belief that

the United .::itates would be able to rJroduce strong cases from the previous
actions of Great Britain in support of the seizure, but he doubted if the
above action would change the opinion held in London.

13

This important

letter continued with the advice that the United States must put the
matter in such a shape as to save its honor, and to put Great Britain in
the wrong "if they refuse your proPositionll.14

Bright continued:

I am looking alone to your great country, the hope of
freedom and humanit y, and I implore you not on any feeling
that nothing can be conceded, and that England is arrogant
and seeking a quarrel, to play the game of every enemy of
your country. l~ations in gre2tt crises and difficulties
have done that which in their prosperous and powerful hour

10
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Charles F. ddams, "Trent Affair", Proceedings of lIi...assachusetts HistoriSociety, Doston, 1912, 152. Hereafter this work will be cited as
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the J:.. would not have done, and they have done it 7;i thout
humiliation or disgrace. You may uisappoint your enemies
by the moueration and reasonableness of your conduct, and
every honest and good ma.n in .i!:ngland will applaud your
vdsdom. Put all the fireaters in the 1'·,rong, and Zurope
vdll admire the sagacity of your government .15
In t he opinion of the author, bright appears to be addressing and
giving advice to Seward rather than Sumner.
correspondence was to

enligh~en

Of cour se th e purpose of this

the United States and Great Britain on

their actions and attitudes towards each other.

Special attention must be

paid to this letter, and the tone and contents of Seward's final answer to
Lord .Lyons.
On December

14, 1861,

Bright again warned the United states that if

it desired victory against the South to have no war with England. 16

He

advised the United states to make every concession rather than give Great
Britain a pretence for aiding the South in the wirilling of "the war. 17

He

said that in case the demands by England cannot be complied with, to make
an offer of arbitration or negotiation of s orne sort that will "make it
impossible for our 'religious public' to support war."lS

He believed

that the mare generous and liberal the United states could be in their
answer, the more difficult it would be for those people despising American

15 ill9., 315, quoting Bright.
16 Ibid., 315; also Charles F. Adams, :lvlassachusetts Society, 153.
17 Trevelyan, 315.
18 Charles F. Adams, llilassachusetts Society:, 154, quoting Bright.

rr--------..
I

37

.

Institutions to make war. 19
Richard Cobden also carried on a correspondence with Charles Sumner
in which the problems existing in both countries were also expressed.

These

letters vindicate Cobden of the charge brought against him by his opponents.
20
The charga concerned his being a disparager of his country.
In arguing
these points of international policy and law with Sumner, he never fails

.

to protest against the high-handedness and disregard for precedent to which
a government fighting for its existence is always.prone.

His judicious

analysis of the change which public opinion in Great Britain underwent regar ding the merits of the Civil Vvar and the prospects of the "Trent Affair"
is even today of great value.

The consistent support rendered by Cobden·

and Bright to the Northern cause, and the evidence they presented to show
that the democracy of Britain was heart and soul with the Union, went far
to help establish better relations between Great Britain and the United
states.

At the beginning of the Civil War, Cobden did not realize the

true significance of the struggle.

Two of the reasons why his sympathy

wavered between the North and the South were that he felt the North was
the aggressor of the strife by attempting to prevent the South fran seceeding; and that the Southerners being slaveholders were .Free-Traders.

19

21

Ibid., 154.

20 William H. Dawson, Richard Cobden and lforeign Policy, George Allen and
Company, London, 1926, 236. Henceforth this work will b e cited as
Dawson.
21

John Morley, Life of Cobden, Chapman, London, 1881, Ii, 373.
this work will be cited as Morley.
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Here he came ~der the influence of John Bright who felt that the breakup
of the United States would be a damaging blow to the cause of freedom all
over the world. 22

From the time of the Rochdale speech, Cobden and Bright

became identified with the support of the Northern cause.
In aletter written November 29, 1861, Cobden informs Sumner that he
can count on the support of Bright, himself, and all of their friends in
the Trent episode, 23 but Cobden also' reminds Sumner th3.t the seizure will
have little effect in discouraging the South, "compared with the indirect
encouragement and hope it may hold out to them of embroiling your government with England. u24

This letter mentions Cobden's lack of confidence in

Seward, and places Seward in Cobden's estimation, in the same category
as Lord Palmerston.

On December

5, 1861, Cobden wrote to Sumner that he

was enclosing a copy of John Bright's Rochdale speech, and conveys his
interest in maintaining peace.

He begs Sumner to send sopies of any

documents or despatches; relating to private property, and concerning
seizure, which have not been made public in Great Britain. 25

He feels

convinced that the French Emperor would have the support of the French
people if Napoleon III would enter into an alliance with Great Britain,

22 Ibid. , II, 373.
23 Ibid. , II, 390.
24 Ibid. , Ii, 39l.
'1'. F. Univirs, London, 1918,
Henceforth this work will be cited as Hobson.

25 John A. Hobson, Richard Cobden,

346.
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and recognize the South. 26

.

He continues:

For ourselves in England, in spite of the bluster of
the Times, the majority are anxious for peace. Do not
overrate the power of the Times •••• Now its circulation
is not perhaps one-tenth of the daily Press~ The star
and the kanchester Examiner ••• circulate far more than
the limes. But it cannot be denied that the great motives
of hope and fear which kept us at peace and inclined the
English Government always to recede in pending controversies with you are gone. The English people have no
sympathy with you on either side •••• fhere are two subjects on which we are unanimous and. fanatical--personal
freedom and Free Trade •••• In your case we observe a
mighty quarrel: on one side protectionists, on the other
the slave-owners. The protectionists say they do not
seek to put down slavery. The slave-owners say they
want Free Trade. Need you wonder at the confusion in
John Bull's poor head? He gives it up! Leaves it to
the Government, Which Government, by the way, is the
most friendly to your Government, that could be found
in England, ifor although Palmerston is fond of hot
water, he boasts that he never got us into a serious
war. As for his colleagues, they are all sedate,
peaceable men.
God bless us. riA mad world, my masters" 127
The noted historian, James F. Rhodes, does not agre1e with Cobden's
viewpoint of the influence of the Times, but he does agree with the accurateness of Cobden's remarkes on the British government and recommends that they
be borne inmind.
On December

28'
6, 1861, Cobden mentions that he had read General Scott's

letter, and quotes a liberal portion of the t ext.

26

The gist of the quotation

Ibid., 347.

27 Ibid., 350; also Rhodes, III, 529-530, quoting Cobden.
28 Rhodes, III, 530, footnote.

I'

of Scott's

l~ter

is that, although it would be a disadvantage at this time

for the United states to surrender any of her maritime privileges, nevertheless the United b'tates will "be faithful to her traditional policy upon
this subject, and to the spirit of her political institutions.,,29

The above

quotation bears striking resemblance to a portion of Seward's note to Lord
Lyons in which is mentioned the position of the United states in the
"Trent Affair".

The letter continues that if Cobden were in the position

of the United states, he would release Mason and Slidell and demand the
abandonment of the old code of maritime law upheld by Great Britain. 30
The reader must bear in mind that this letter was probably the last
of Cobden's correspondence to Sumner, to reach the United States and the
ears of Seward in time for Seward's answer to Lord Lyons.
In October of 1861, Seward selected Thurlow Weed to go to London and
correct amny of the erroneous impressions in the minds of the British, and
also undo some of the work of the Confederate agents.

He arrived in London

at the tin:e of the Trent seizure, and upon the invitation of the London
Times, he sent that paper a letter which was published.

In this letter

he entered a general denial of the assertion that the Federal government
desired a rupture with England, and did what he could to change the

29

Charles Sumner, iforks of Charles Sumner, Lee and Shepard, Boston, 1900,
VIII, 27; also Morley, II, 392. Henceforth the first mentioned book
will be cited as Sumner, Works.

30 Sumner, Works, VIII, 27.
31 ThurlowW. Barnes, Life Of Thurlow Weed, Houghton, Mifflin, New York,
1884, II, 355. Hereafter this work will be cited as Barnes.
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.

British viewpoint towards the Seward-Newcastle story.3 1

He referred the

British public to Charles Francis Adams for a t rue reflex of American
sympathies.

The opinion was expressed that England had no

re~l

grievance

of any sUbstantial nature against the United States.3.2 Weed said that he
knew nothing of the proposed course of the British government, but he expressed the opinion that a peremptory demand for the release of the envoys
would be met by as
~ere

per~nptory

.

a refusal, since in temper and pride Americans

as unreasoning as the bad example of their mother country.

He did not

believe Mason and Slidell were worth a war, and hoped the matter would be
considered calmly and with due deliberation. 33
His communication was printed in the London Times, but his assertion
that Seward's unfriendly utterances,\b;eginning with the "Newcastle story",
were misunderstood, did not convince the Times, which answered him at
length. 34 The ~ asserted its belief that upon his ability to involve
the United states in a war with England, Seward had staked his official,
and "most probably his political existence. 1135

31 Thurlow VI. Barnes, Life Of Thurlow Weed, Houghton, kifflin, New York,
1884, II, 355. Hereafter this work will be cited as Barnes.
3.2

Ibig., 356.

33 Ibid.,

358.

34 Ibid., 354.
35

Ibid., 358, quoting the London Times.

In a let!-er of December 2, 1861, Weed mentions that he saw a letter
from a high source in London, in winch it was again said that Seward
wanted to provoke a war with England for the purpose of getting Canada.3 6
The letter continued that Seward was in a tight place and "I pray that you
may be imbued with the vdsdom the emergency requires. 1I37

On December 4,

1861, Seward was again warned that systematic agencies and efforts must

.

have been employed by the Confederacy to poison both the English government and pwople against him,3

8

l'Iall around they (your friends) found

people fortified with evid enc es of your hostility to England. ,,39
later, Weed told Seward, that the Duke of

l~ewcastle

Two days

incident was being used

to put the Idnistry agciinst him; and also that -the story had been given to
the newspapers which added to the fuel against Seward. 40

He hoped that

Seward foresaw the wisdom of concession to Britain, because England was
rapidly making gigantic preparations for v'Iar.

He also told Seward, flI

was told yesterday, repeatedly, that I ought to write to the President
den-Landing your dismissal. ,,41
that people in .t.:ngland

v~ere

This letter closed with the interesting view
saying that Seward sought war with .&lgland
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Ibid. , III, 27, quoting I/eed.
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Ibid. , III, 28.
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Ibid. , III, 28, quoting;,eed.
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Ibid. , III, 29, quoting ',veed.

43

.

because he felt that disaster loomed for the North in the Ci'Yil YJar; and
"the suspicion that Slidell and iv"ason are in collusion with Wilkes and
Fairfaw gains ground. n42
Weed wrote on December 10, from London and suggested that it was
really important that Seward devote some attention to ironing out the difficulties in relation to London and Paris. 43

He seriously warned Seward

that unless he averted it, war was i~evitable.44

He continued:

I pray that I am not mistaken in the hope that you
comprehend the disastrous effect of such a Viar. I know,
or fear that at home, another view or side to this question exists. But be assured there is but one side to
it. lvith England as an auxiliary to rebellion, 'We are
crushed out •••• 45
In the opinion of the author, 'l'hurlow Weed's views and advice to
Seward must. have carried much weight, beeause of their long friendship
and the obvious sincerity with which Weed wrote.
\villiam L. Dayton, .lvi.inisterto france, wrote to Seward in an un- .
published despatch from Paris on Jecember 3, 1861, that upon the Trent
question the United states will have scarcely a friend among the press
'
..,
46
or publ lC men ln J:!Jurope.

Dayton stated that he had beenllasked by
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Ibid. , III, 29, quoting Weed.
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Ibid. , III, 29.
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Ibid. , III, 30.
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Ibid. , III, 30, quoting Weed.
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44

.

intelligent gentlemen here why it Vias that you seemed so determined to
pick a quarrel with England. 1147

He believed it was vain to answer that

no such determination eli d or co uld exist, becaus e und. er such circumstances
it would have been an act of folly believed by no person. 48

This very im-

portant despatch concluded with the statement that Dayton felt whether
"right or wrong, this seizure of the Confederate commissioners on b03.rd a
British ship has come at a most inoPi;ortune moment."49
Thouvenel informed Dayton at this time that, in case of war, the moral
force of French opinion would be against the United States, and that all
the maritime powers with whom we had conferred agreed that Wilkes had violated international law. 50
On lJecember 5, 1061, John Bigelow wrote to Seward that the errent
sei,::ure was regarded in Paris by the press, the people, and the government,
as a rude assault U1Jon the dignity of neutral nation. 51

He also prepared

a letter expressing the belief that the United States would surrender the
Confederates if Great Britain should. adopt the liberal policy favored by
the United states gov ernme nt .

Thurlow vieed had thi s letter signed by

General ~Jinfield scott, t,hen in .i.'aris. 52
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This so-called Scott letter was
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published in the London Times of December 6, 1861. 53

...

This letter was

quoted throughout Europe and also appeared in the .New York Times of December 19, 1861. 54
The next and perhaps the most important person in this group to be
considered is Charles Francis Adams, Minister to Great Britain.
over the London delegation on May 13, 1861.

.

Adams took

He was well fitted to his new

post by previous experience, by his power of cool judgement, and by his
power of careful expression in critical times.

55

His very coolness, some-

times appearing as coldness and stiff dignity rendered him an especially
fit agent to deal with Russell, a man of very similar characteristics. 56

On November 30, Seward forwarded a despatch to Adams in which Seward
casually mentions the capture of Mason ani Slidell and says that it is
to be met and disposed of by tie two goverl'lIOOnts in the best possible
sPirit. 57

He also informed Adams that Lord Lyons hadn't as yet approached

the subject because as he was presumably awaiting instructions from London.

58

Seward also felt that the ground taken by the British government

should be first made known to the United States, and that if there must be

53
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a discussion,..,it should be held in Washington.

He further advised Adams

not to attach much importance to the case, and informed the Minister that
WIlkes acted without any instructions from his government. 59

He closes

with, III trust that the British government will consider the subject in a
friEndly temper, and it. may expect t he best dis positi on on the part of
this govern.nent. u60

As an added postscript Seward advises Adams that if·

it is considered eX''pedient this confidential despatch could be read to
Palma rston or Russell.

61

In a despatch to Seward dated November 29, 1861, Adams refers to the
imperati ve nature of the IITrent crisis" and says that the law officers of
the Crown have modified their original position and now deny the right of
the United states to "take out persons when they do not take papers and
things. 1162

He informs Seward as to the probable British action of deman-

ding an apology and the release of the men.

anxiety has mounted for the

II

63

He confesses that his

fate of my unhappy country. ,,64

Adams closed

the despatch with the statement that he flshall await with resignation the
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instructions Yilich will probably close my mission. n65

Adams whose wisdom

increased with the energency, strongly advised on December 3, 1861, against
the approving Wilkes' act, unless the Unit ed states was ready to assume
Great Britain's claim of the dominion of the seas.

66

Adams believed the

neutral rights of the United states were as valuable to us as ever, while
tirne had reflected anything but credit on our steady defence of them against
superior povier. 67

The Minister held that the position taken by the United

states had always been one of resistance to dritish policy which lIendangers
the privileges of neutrals to be free of search.,,68

Adams told Seward:

I should be sorry to see our own country varying
from what seems to me so honourable a record under the
temptation of a little ephemeral success, entailing as
it does so many of the most serious consequences to the
prosperity of two great nations •••• 6 9
Three days later he wrote again to Seward that the British

~inisters

and people fully believed that it was the intention of the United states
goverrunent to arive t hem into hostilities. 70

He mentioned the British

preparations for war, such as the proclamations forbiddingt he export of
salt-peter, gunpowder, and arms, also of the British fleet being put into
readiness for instant action. 7l

In the next paragraph, Adams mentioned

that he had done everythiDg in his pow er to combat the Briti sh idea that

65
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67 This despatch was received by Seward on December 16.
Official Records, 1116.
~., 1116.

~., 1119.

Ibid., 1119.
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the Administr<ltion was hostileLo Great Britain, Jut the result has been to
give him credit for good intentions rather than lito inspire conviction of
the Government's sincerity.,,72 Adams closes the despatch with the idea
that by the middle of January at the latest, diplomatic relations will have
been broken off between the two countries, "without any act of mine. ,,73
In the despatch of December 11, 1861, Adams protests against the predicament in which he is placed by the lack of an official viewpoint from
the United states concerning the seizure.

The minister complains that

this type of action plays into the hands of the enemy by their stating that
the conciliatory policy of Adams is not the true policy of the United states
74
government.
On

December 12, 1861, another despatch to Seward was written which

conveyed the British attitude towards the lIaffair ll by mentioning the
uneasiness of the London stock market, the feeling of different religious
,
75
groups, and the preparations of the government arsenals.
He expected
his mission to end in another two weeks should no special instructions
76
be received in regard to future action.
On December 19th Adams went by appointment to the Foreign Office
and had a long interview with Russell.
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The two discussed the bearing

49
of Seward's

n~te

in full and reached the conclusion that an adjustment

could be arrived at with no great difficulty.77 Adams wrote to Seward as a
result of this interview that he "inferred that his Lordship did not desire
war; but that he was likely to be pushed over the precipice by his desire to
walk too close to the edge.,,78

The interview ended and Russell told Adams

that if all matters were left to them, there could be no doubt as to a
79
peaceful solution.
By December 27, 1861, Adams felt that the Ministry, at least was eager
to find away out, and that the British government would not press the Trent
80
to an extreme unless they were driven to it.
On December 29~ 1861, Adams
wrote Seward that he thought the signs were clear of a considerable degree of
reaction.

He also explained the causes of the nearly unanimous European

support of England in the contention:
Unquestionably the view of all the countries
is that the opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining new and enlarged modifications of international law which will hereafter materially restraig
the provarbial tendency of the country on the ocean. l
This international tension lasted three more weeks, and during these
weeks nothing more was heard in London from Seward concerning the "affair".
No advice could be given from Seward because his policy was in doubt until
the attitude of the British government could be ascertained.

77 Charles F. Adams, Jr.,
78

Char~es

Francis Adams, 228.

Ibid., 221, quoting Adams.

79 ~., 229.
80 Charles F. Adams, Massachusetts Society, 109.
81 ~., 110, quoting Adams.

Then in London

50
between the

n~eteenth

of December, 1861 and the eighth of January, 1862,

it was not clear what Secretary Seward had in mind when he wrote the
despatch of November 30.

r
.
CHAPTER IV
LORD LYONS' MEETINGS WIlli SEWARD

Lord Russell upon hearing of a Federal warship arriving at Falmouth
and after coaling proceeding to Southam)ton, began thinking of the Trent
and her passengers.

He was advised by his law officers that a United

States warship would have the right to board a British mail steamer, open
her bags examine their contents, and if the steamer should prove liable
to confiscation for carrying dispatches from the enemy, put a prize crew
on board and carry her to a port of the United States for adjudication. l
In that case the law officers thought she might, and in their opinion she
ought to disembark the passengers on the mail steamer at same convenient
port.

2

But they believed the Americans would have no right to remove

Mason and Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to
pursue her voyage. 3 A few days before the law officers gave this opinion,
the San Jacinto intercepted the

~

and did the very thing which the law

officers had advised she had no right to do.

1 Charles F. Adams, Charles Francis Adams, 221.
2 Ibid., 222.

3

~.,

222.
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With a PaJ'liament largely hostile to the United states, with nearly
all of the rich and influential class unfriendly,4 with a press which exhibited hatred for the North, with a large population of merchants, tradesmen, and cotton workers who were complaining of the blockade, it may readily
be imagined what effect the news of Captain Wilkes' act created in England.
The government was called upon to vindicate the honor of the British flag

.

"by exacting a full and complete reparation, or, in the event of failure,
war mU5t be declared against the Union. ,,5
-The London Times was the exponent of the British opinion at this time,
so far as the government and ruling classes were heard.

6 In discussing the

matter, the Times was willing to admit that similar British precedents were
entitled to be considered in justification of the act of Wilkes.

The com-

ment was as follows:
But it must be remembered that these decisions
were given under circumstances very different from
those which now occur. steamers in those days did
not exist and mail vessels carrying letters wherein
all of the nations of the world have immediate interests were unknown. We were fighting for existence,
and we did in those days what we shou d neither do
nor allow others to do in these days.

7

During the entire period of excitement which was caused in England by
the seizure of the commissioners, the wrath of the British press and public

4 Rhodes, III, 502.

5 London Times, November 29, 1861, 6.

6 Rhodes, III, 530.
7 London Times, November 28, 1861, 8
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was aimed at Secretary of state Seward. 8 His recorufitendation that the coasts
and lake frontiers of the United states be

~ut

into a condition to resist

foreign aggression, caused all Englishmen who sympathized with the South

to hate him.

It was said and continually repeated by the London Times that

Seward and t.he Federal government at Washington proposed to annex Canada

to the United States, and that a pretext was wanted for a quarrel and war
9
with Great Britain.
Lord Paltmerston referred the Trent llmatterlt back to the law officers
of the Crown for a final decision.

Their verdict was that Captain Wilkes

had passed on a violation of neutrality, on the spot, instead of sending
· d'lcat·lone 10
t h e Trent as a prize int 0 port f or a d JU

On November 29, two days after the news of the boarding of the Trent
and seizure of the envoys had reached England, Lord Palmerston prepared a
note to Queen Victoria in which he demanded of the American government, a
disavowal of the act, and setting the prisoners free, and under British
protection.

11

The Queen preferred that language less harsh and offensive

in character should be used.

,;;'ueen Victoria and Prince Albert penned the

recorurrtended changes which were later adopted in Russell's instructions to
Lord Lyons. 12

8 London Times, December 2, 1861, 6.
9 Trevelyan, 318.

10

Charles F. Adams, Charles Francis Adams, 221.

11 Walpole, II, 346.
12 Rhodes, III, 525.
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Lord Lyous, of course, knew all about the Trent incident long before
the despatch concerning it reached him from the Foreign Minister, but he
determined "not to take any aecided step in the matter ll , until he ltreceived
orders from His Majesty's Goverrunent 1113
0

Thus, in the absence of an

Atlantic cable, a wholesome delay of six weeks ensured between the boarding
of the Trent and the reception of Lord John Russell's critical despatch•

.

The first thing which Seward is known to have said or written about
the affair is his confidential letter to Adams on November 30, 1861.

In

this despatch as was previously mentioned, Seward informed Adams that the
act was done without instructions and without the knowledge of the United
states. 14 In this despatch, Seward also stated that Lord Lyons has refrained from communicating with him on the subject, and.

It

I thought it

equally wise to reserve ourselves until we hear what the British government
15
may have to say.1t
Seward repeated this in an official despatch of
November 30, which was conununicated to the British government.

Fran the

day when the capture was first know, Seward and the British Minister did
not meet, until on December 19, 1861, when Lyons came to the state Department, and acquainted Seward in general terms with Rus sell's despatch.
The reserve of Seward and Lyons, and their avoidance of each other
during this month of waiting, show how strongly both felt the gravity of
the situation, and their worry of serious consequences.

13 State Papers, 608.

14 Official Records, 1109.
15
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The decision
... formed by the British government was conveyed by Lord
16
Russell to Lord ~ons on November 30th.
The note mentioned that friendly
relations have long existed between Great Britain and the United states,
and t hat he, (Lord Russell), was unwilling to believe that Wilkes was acting
17
on orders from his government.
Lyons was also instructed that the United
states should liberate the four men, and that they be placed under British
protection, with an apology due to th~ British government. 18 If these
terms were not offered to Lord Lyons, then he was to propose them to Seward.
In a second dispatch on the same day Russell requested Lyons to inform
Seward that the answer of the United States was not to exceed seven days,
and that if there was no answer by that time the British legation in
19
Washington was to return to London.
In a private letter Russell advised Lyons that at the first meeting
with Seward he was not to take his letter of instructions, but to prepare
him for it.

At the second meeting he was to read the full despatch.

Ac-

cording to Montague Bernard, Russell added:
If he asks what will be the consequence of
his refusing compliance, I think you should say
that you wish to leave him and the President
quite free to take their own course, and that
20
you desire to abstain from anything like menance.

16 state Papers, 605.
17 ~., 605.
18 ~., 605.
19 ~., 606.
20 Montague Bernard, Historical Account of Neutrality of Great Britain Durin
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The last ...diplomatic note reveals the motives and policy of the British
government in the whole porceeding.

It was on the part of Great Britain a
21
case of uncalled for braggadocio and bullying.
On December

7, 1861, Russell wrote another private letter to Lyons.

Russell mentions that he has been thinking of Seward's possible evasive
answers which might fall short of Britaints demands. 22 Russell wanted a

.

simple yes or no for an answer which had to be made within seven days of
presentation.

The letter closed with a post-script that he would be

satisfied if Mason and Slidell were placed under the protection of the
British flag, but Lyons was to leave Washington if this was not obtained. 23
These despatches and letters, if they had been sent alone would have been
grave.

The gravity of the situation was emphasized by the hurried despatch

of the British Guards and other troops to Canada, and by the fact that
instructions were sent to Sir Arthur Milne, who commanded the British fleet
in American waters. 24 Meanwhile a notable change had taken pla~e in American public opinion.

It now regarded "the Wilkes affair unfavorably and

would much prefer it had not occurred at all,1I 25 a reaction without question

21 Charles F. Adams, "The Trent Affair", American Historical Review,
Macmillan Company, London, 1912, XVII, 556. Henceforth this work
will be cited as Charles F. Adams, American Historical Review.

22 Newton I, 64.
23
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64.

24 state Papers, 606.

25 Charles F. Adams, Massachusetts Society, 107.
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almost wholly:" caused by the knowledge of t he British demand and the unani26
mous support giverr it by the British PUblic.
On December 18, 1861, at 11:30 P.M., a messenger delivered Russell's
despatch to Lyons, and also two private letters in which full instructions
were given. 27 Thus, on December 19, Lyons acquainted Seward with the
general nature of Russell's leading despatch •

.

Lyons stated, according to Russell's words, that the only redress which
could satisfy the British government would be the immediate release of the
prisoners to him, that they might be placed under British protection, and
also a suitable apology for the action cOmmitted. 28 He added that Britain
hoped the United States would offer this reparation of its

o~

accord, and

because of his hope for this arrangement, he had come without any written
demand. 29

If this was possible he was willing to be guided by Seward, as

to the conduct "which would render its attainment most easy. ,,30 Seward
asked Lyons, if any time was fixed within which the United states government must reply.

Lyons answered that he did not like to answer the question

because he desired to abstain from anything which suggested menance. 3l
After more of Seward's probing questions' Lyons finally stated that he must
2
have Seward's answer within seven days.3

26

Ibid." 110.

27 State PaEers, 623.
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29 Ibid."
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31 Ibid.,
2 Newton

623.
623.
623.
623.
I 6 •
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Seward r:quested a copy of the despatch unofficially and informally
as so much "depended on the wording of it that it was impossible to come
to a decision without reading it. ,,33

Seward said that if he was given a

copy of the message, it would be given on the understanding that no one but
34
the President and himself should know that it,had been delivered0
Lyons
agreed to the suggestion and after returning to the Embassy, sent Seward
a copy of the despatch.
In the opinion of Lyons, Seward received the communication "seriously,

and with dignity, but without any manifestation of dissatisfaction.,,35
Seward closed the interview with the assurance that he was aware of
6
"frienUyand conciliatory manner in which I had made it.,,3

th~

Lyons purposely avoided menance in the interview because he feared
that

men~ce

could be an obstacle to the United states yielding, and at

the same time let Seward know how earnest Great Britain felt towards the
matter)7

The !iiinister did not believe the United states would give in,

but at the same time he did not regard it as impossible, especially if the
next news from England would bring tidings of warlike preparations)8

33

Ibid., I, 66, quoting Lyons.

34 Ibid., I, 66.
35

State Papers, 623.

36 Ibid., 623, quoting Lord Lyons.
37 Newton, I, 66 0
38 Ibid., I, 66 0
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After Seward
received the despatch he again visited Lyons and expressed
...
himself pleased to find the "despatch was courteous and friendly and not
dictatorial of menacing. 1I39 Seward asked Lyons what would happen if after
the seven days Seward s,ent a refusal or a proposal to discuss the question. 40
~ons

answered that if the answer was not satisfactory, he could not accept

' t 41

l. •

.

On December 21, 1861, ~ons again visited Seward.

Seward stated that

other pressing duties had prevented him from fully mastering this question,
and he requested that the fonnal presentation of the case might be post42
poned until the follow~ng Monday.
~ons agreed to this request on the
condition that the meeting would be held early Monday morning so Lyons could
43
mail his despatches on the next available ship.
At the appointed hour on December 23, Lyons called again, read the
despatch and left Seward a copy of it.44 Seward said that the President
would be immediately informed of the contents of the despatch and that
Lyons "should without delay receive a communication with regard to it.,,45

39 State Papers, 623, quoting Lord Lyons.
40

Newton I, 66.

41 Ibid., I, 66.
42 State PaEers, 625.
43

~.,

625.

44 Ibid., 626.
45

Ibid., 625.
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From December .2.3 the seven days, in which an answer to Lord Lyons had to be

...

made, began.
Lyons' faimess can be judged by his allowing Seward plenty of time,
in not presenting the British despatch officially until the Last possible
moment, that is, until the eve of the
ship.

~ep9.rture

of t he next weekly mail

His aim throughout the negotiation was to bring it about that the
•

.

1

United States compliance "should have as much as possible, the air of havmg
been made spontaneously. II

46

In the despatch of December .2.3rd which Lyons sent to Russell infonning

him of the latest details of his meeting with Seward, Lyons mentioned that
he believed the United states was frightened.

still he felt that nothing

but the beginning of hostilities would convince most of the people of the
United states that Britain would fight.
Seward was now on the side of peace.

47 Lyons also informed Russell that

He presumes that "ten months of office

have dispelled many of his illusions. n48 Still he cannot earnestly say how
Seward will react to the British demands because "if the President and the
Cabinet throw the whole burden on his shoulders, he may refuse to bear it .1149

46

~o,

6.25.

47 Newton, I, 68.
48

~.,

I, 69.

49 Ibid., I, 70.
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.

Lord Lyons carried out the spirit as well as the letter'of his
instructions.

During this period his attitude of reserve was irreproachable.

He wrote to Russell that he "avoided the subject of the capture on board
the Trent as much as possible, and have said no more than that it is an
untoward event which I very much regret. 1I50
At this time there was nothing for Lord Lyons to do, but to wait
for Secretary Seward's reply.

50 Official Records, 1097.

...
CHAPTER V
THE CABINET MEETING

All of the members of President Lincoln t s Cabinet, with the exception
of Montgomery Blair, held a different attitude after the Cabinet meetings
of December 25th and 26th than they did when the news of the seizure was
announced.
According to Gideon Welles, in the beginning Seward was most elated
and jubilant over the cpature of liitason and Slidell, and "for a time made
no attempt to conceal his gratification and approval of the act of
Wilkes. lIl

Frederic Bancroft, a biographer of Seward, believed this to be

highly probable because IIwere it otherwise, Seward would have been a rare
exception. ,,2 Yet it mus t be remembered that as far as the public knew,
Seward was non-committal on the affair.
Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, was much pleased, and sent a
letter congratulating Wilkes on his safe arrival and especially on the
great public service he had rendered. 3

1

Welles, 185.

2

Bancroft, II, 2320

3

Official Records, 1109.

I

'II
II
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Bensou J. Lossing who says that he happened to be in the War Department
when the news reached Simon Cameron, participated in three cheers for Wilkes,
led by the Secretary of War. 4
Salmon Chase felt that the seizure was warranted, and also that Wilkes
had done his duty by seizing Mason and Slidell.
Attorney-General Bates, in his diary, believed the seizure not only
to be legal, but also that Wilkes would have been justified in confiscating
the shiP.5
the seizure.

He also believed that Great Britain would not take offense at

6

The only manber of the Cabinet who believed that Wilkes had committed
a blunder was Montgomery Blair.
To analyze the reasons for the above reaction it must be remembered
that no event of the war up to that time caused
of the

loya~

6.0

much rejoicing in all

states. 7 In the opinion of the North, these men were bent

on a traitorous errand which might lead to the permanent dissolution of
the Union.

Further.more, after the early Confederate victories this was one

of the first opportunities for the North to celebrate what they regarded

4 Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial History of Civil War, T. Belknap, Hartford,
1868, II, 156.

Hereafter this work will be cited as Lossing.

5 Edward Bates, "Diary of Edward Bates ll , American Historical Association,
edited by Howard K. Beale, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1933,
IV, 202. Hereafter this work will be cited as Bates.
6 Ibid., 202.

7 Bancroft, II, 226.

as a victor3_

In addition, the attitude of Great Britain towards the

seizure did not reach the United states for another two weeks.
A dispute has arisen over the reaction of Abraham Lincoln when he
first was informed of the seizure.

Lossing writes that Lincoln took a

very sober view of the seizure and told him in conversation that he regarded it a violation of the principles for which we fought England in 1812.
According to Lossing, Lincoln held the traitors to be flwhite elephants" and
that if Great Britain would protest the seizure, the United states would
have to surrender them and apologize_

Otherwise we would be admitting that

England has been right nfor at least sixty years.,,9 Welles, Nicolay" and
Hay seemingly hold the same attitude; yet there are certain indications
that Lincoln did not want to retreat before the British threats.

These

indications seem to lead to a settlement of the dispute by arbitration or
negotiation.

They are exhibited by Lincoln's draft of a letter proposing

arbitration and by his conversation with Seward after the Cabinet meetings
of December 25th and 26th.

Both of these incident s will be further de-

veloped in this chapter.
In the opinion of Thornton K. Lothrop, a biographer of Seward, the
Lossing conversation with Lincoln is false.

Lothrop holds that the stor,y

was first published seven years after the conversation took place" and has

8 Lossing, I, 156.
9

~."

157" quoting Lincoln.
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never been confirmed.

10

Lothrop also holds that, according to Welles'

statements, Lincoln was impressed with the gravity of the situation and
thought the capture embarassing only because he did not know what could
.be, done with the prisoners and was afraid what the punishment would be
demanded for them.
I

Thus, Lothrop states that the two opinions are quite

different; yet not absolutely

i~consistent

with each other.

11

Seward's decision made, he had to convince the President.

Lincoln

told Seward to go on preparing his answer as to why Mason and Slidell
should be surrendered while he would try to state the reasons .why they
should not be given up.

12

Lincoln believed that both sets of reasons should

then be compared.
At this point, I would like to present a digest of Lincoln's despatch
which he wrote at this time.

In this note the President wrote that, if

there existed no fact or facts pertinent to the case beyond those stated
by the British government, the reparation sought by Great Britain from
the United States would be justly due and promptly made. 13 Lincoln stated
that he was reluctant to volunteer his view of the case with no assurance
that the British government would consent to hear him.

Yet he was directed

to say, that the government intended no affront to the British flag or to
the British nation, and this act was done without the authorization of the
government. 14

10 Lothrop, 307.
11

~.,

308.

12 Bancroft, II, 234.

13 Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln's Works, VII, 63.
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An inquiry was made as to whether the British government would consider the

...

American side of the question, including the fact of existing insurrection
in the United states; the neutral attitude of England toward the belligerents
their American citizenship and the traitorous mission of the captured persons
the British captain's knowledge of these things when the ccmnissioners embarked at Havana; the place where the capture was made, and the bearing of
international law and precedent upon the case. 15

It was then stated that,

if the foregoing together with any others pertinent to either side of the
case could be submitted, the Federal government would, if England were
willing, cheerfully submit the whole affair to the peaceful arbitration
16
and would abide by the result.
The last paragraph of the proposed despatch provided that no redress should exceed in kind and amount that which
was already demanded and that the award should constitute the basis of a
rule for the determination of similar cases between the two nations in the
17
future.
In the proposed despatch Lincoln's crafty phraseology is quite
evident in relation to pinning down and holding Great Britain in check,
now and in the future, in maritime disputes such as the Trent affair.
This draft did not suit Lincoln, and was never presented to the Cabinet,
but its importance to this subject exists from the fact that, undoubtedly
Seward and Lincoln had been considering the above-named proposals as one of
the ways of extricating the United States from the position in which it had

15 Ibid., 64.
16 Ibid., 64.
17 Ibid., 65.

--------------------.........
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been placed.. After the Cabinet meeting on December 26th, Lincoln told
Seward that he could not find an argument that would satisfy his own mind,
"and that proved to me your ground was the right one. 1I1B
The Cabinet meeting was set for Tuesday morning, December 24th, but
Seward postponed it until Christmas day because he was not yet ready.

On

the morning of December 25th, IB61 no one except Blair and Seward seems to
have favored a full compliance with the British demand.

Seward later wrote

to Weed and said that when the subject was taken up by the Cabinet, the other
did not wish tq concede the case to Great Britain, still they "had no idea
of the grounds upon which it would explain its action.,,19 Yet they were
unanimous towards the release of Mason and Slidell, after two days exami20 This meeting lasted until two o'clock in the afternoon. The
.
nat l.on.
President's experimental draft previously mentioned was not read; there is
no mention of either the reading or the points it raised. More than half
of the days of grace had elapsed and something haa to be done quickly, else
a foreign war would be added to the domestic war.

However desirable

arbitration may have been, it was prevented by the nature of the demand of
England.

One day was not found sufficient for the consideration of this

important matter, and the session was therefore continued on the following

18 frederiCk W. Seward, Life and Letters, III, 26, quoting Lincoln.
19 Weed, II, 409, quoting Seward.
~.,

409.

I

I

r
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day.

Seward's... proposed despatch upon which the surrender was based could

not be fully discussed at one session, so the paper appears to have been
prepared solely by the Secretary of State without the assistance of either
21
Lincoln or any of his Cabinet officers.
Of the debate and various opinions,
we have some record in the subsequent writings of the different persons who
were present.
Salmon Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, believed Wilkes violated
those principles of the law of nations which the United States, so closely
guarded.

Chase said that Wilkes did this by taking the parties concerned
22
from the Trent without invoking any judicial tribunal.
Thus Great Britain
had a right to ask us for a disavowal of the act and the return of Mason and
Slidell.

Chase thought the seizure to be a mere technical violation of

England's neutral rights considering the circumstances under which the act

,

,I

was carried out.
towards England.

There was no aggressive behavior or unfriendly intent

23

,

I

Chase reviewed the hostile intentions of Mason and

Slidell, and the fact of their status being known to the captain of the
Trent.

Here th9 Trent viola.ted English law, and was not treating the United
2
states as a friendly nation. 4 After the English captain refused to exhibit
to Lieutenant Fairfax his passenger list, Chase felt that Wilkes had the
right to break up the voyage, nand send the steamer as prize into a port

21 Lathrop, 306.
22 Robert B. Warden, Life of Salmon P. Chase, Wilstach, Baldwin and Company,
New York, 1874, 393. Hereafter this work will be cited as Warden.

23

~.,

393.
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for trial or.. condemnation. rr25 Wilkes desiring not to inflict a delay on
the other passengers deprived himself of the only means of justifying his
26
capture flthrough judicial decision. II
Thus he believed that the technical
right was vdth England because they could not lawfully be removed from the
ship until a judicial decision had been made.

Chase then stated how we

.

could not afford delays because our commerce might be endangered, the
carrying out of the war hindered, and the attitude of other nations towards
the United states violation of the rights of neutrals should be considered. 27
The Secretary concluded by saying:
It is gall and wormwood to me. Rather than
consent to the liberation of these men, I would
sacrifice everything I possess. But I am consoled by the reflection that, while nothing but
severest retribution is due them, the surrender •••
is ••• simply proving faithful to our own ideas and
traditions under strong temptation to violate them;
simply giving ••• to the world the most signal proof
that the American nation will not ••• for the sake of
inflicting just punishment for rebe~~, commit even
a technical wrong against neutrals.
Gideon Welles held that Seward was at the beginning opposed to any idea
of concession which involved giving up the emissaries, but yielded immediately with dexterity to the peremptory demand of Great Britain.

29

He

stated that Seward should receive credit for his skillful handling and prep30
aration of the despatch.
According to Welles, this exhibited Seward's

25

Ibid., 393, quoting Chase.

26

~.,

393, quoting Chase.

27
28

~.,

394.
quoting Chase.
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readiness,

~act,

difficulties.

and talent to remove himself from and to pass on certain

31

Regarding his personal views towards the case, Welles glosses over the
32
congratulatory telegram he sent Wilkes.
Welles says that even before
the administration had decided upon any action, he thought that Wilkes might
be excused for patriotic reasons, but by no means should his action set a
33
precedent for future action.
Montgomery Blair, the

Post~aster

General, seems form the first to

have held more radical views concerning the matter than did the President
or anyone else.

He did not publicly discuss the case, but to the other

members of the Cabinet he denounced Captain Wilkes' act as an outrage on
the British flag, which he said" the English Minister would seize upon to
make war upon the United States. 34 Not being an admirer of Wilkes, Blair
said that he should be ordered to take Iroquois, with Mason am Slidell on
board,· proceed to England and deliver them over to the British government. 35
This he thought would be a manifestation of the greatest contempt and
indifference for the Confederate emissaries, and a severe rebuke to whatever of alleged intrigues that may have existed between the insurgents in
the United States and the English Cabinet.

31 Ibid." 185.
32· ~., 187.
33 Ibid., 188.
34 William E. Smith, Blair Family in Politics, Macmillan Company, New York"
1933, II, 194. Hereafter this work will be cited as Smith.
35

Ibid." 194.

From.

th~

published. extracts taken from the diary of Attorney-General

Bates, it appears that there was a full and frank discussion of Seward's
note.

All the members of the Cabinet were impressed with the extraordinary

gravity of the situation as probably the fate of the nation depended on
36
the result of their deliberations.
Bates, himself, urged the surrender,
Waiving the legal right about which there was much doubt, he favored
compliance with the British demand on account of the necessity of the case. 37
He told of the dangers of going to war with England and the repercussions
of such an action.

A few of the se dangers would be the breaking of the

blockade, the ruin of United states trade, bankruptcy of the treasury, and
38
According to Bates, President Lincoln and the other
other calamities.
39
manbers were too slow to acknowledge these truths.
Charles Sumner, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations COmmittee,
had no small part to play towards the settlement of the

"~affair't.

He

was in Boston when the news of the seizure arrived and at once said, 'fWie
shall have to give them uP.1I 40

In his letters to Cobden and Bright, Sumner

36 Bates, 216.
37 ~., 216.
38 Ibid., 216.
39 Ibid., 216.
40 Moorfield Storey, Charles F. Sumner, Houghton, Mifflin, New York, 1900,
209. Hereafter this work will be cited as Storey.
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did his beet to arouse the moral sentiment of England in our favor, and to
warn against the calamities for which Great Britain would be held responsible
if there was intervention or any other unfriendly action on her part.41

He was deeply moved by the attitude of English public opinion, and the hos42
tile attitudes of EnglandTs leaders.
In the opinion of Charles

Fr~cis

Adams, during these trying times the

bearing of Sumner was above criticism; 43 and when the time came he used his
influence in such a way that added glory and credit to the United States
44
during these trying days.
The peremptory tone of the English demand and the strong feeling in the
United states made Sumner's course difficult.

Sumner persistently urged

his views on Lincoln; and as soon as the Bright-Cobden correspondence was
45
received, he read or sent them to Lincoln.
He attended the Cabinet
meeting on December 25, 1861, and read to Lincoln and the Cabinet leaders,
private letters fram Bright and Cobden.

These letters, as has been men-

tioned, earnestly urged a yielding for America and depicting the strength
46
of British feeling.
If Sumner's opinion was asked, he doubtless expressed

41 Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner, Roberts Brothers,
Boston, 1893, IV, 147. Hereafter this v,ork will be cit ed as Pierce.
42 illQ;., 147.
43

Charles F. Adams, Massachusetts Society, 63.

45

Sumner,~,

46 Ibid., 270

VIII, 24.
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himself warmly in favor of Seward's decision.
During the course of the Cabinet meeting of December 25th, a despatch
arrived from Thouvenel to the French Minister at Washington, Mercier.

This

despatch which had been written in Paris on December 3, 1861 was received
by Mercier that morning, and impressed by its importance, hurried to the
47
This
White House and begged that it be submitted at once to Seward.
despatch fully confirmed the reports about France's attitude.

It

mention~

that France was glad to find Great Britain reversing her practice;

48

but

what must have stirred the men present at the meeting was the sincere
appeal made to the United States not to commit the fatal mistake of trying
49
to defend what had been done.
Thouvene1 believed that the only thing the
Uni ted states could do, would be to-yield to the British demands, return
the commissioners, and offer such explanations as would satisfy Great
50
Britain.
The despatch closed by saying that Thouvene1 wished because of
51
friendship, to make his interpretation known.
As the title of this paper suggests, it is outside the scope of the
subject to treat the detailed attitude of European countries towards the
settlement of the Trent affair.

The reason for this statement is that by

the time the European foreign ministers presented their views towards the

47

John B. McMaster, History of the United states During Lincoln's
Administration, Appleton, New York, 1927, 151. Hereafter this
work will be cited as McMaster.

48 Official Records, 1116.
49

~.,

1117.
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affair,

~ward

had already prepared his answer to Great Britain.

Neverthe-

less, Seward did receive warnings concerning the European attitude, as has
already been mentioned in Chapter III.
After a studied examination of the Cabinet leaders, the main reason
for hesitation was doubtless the fear of public opinion in the North.
was certain that a surrender of

~he

It

commissioners would bring the dis-

pleasure of the people upon the government, which would be accused of having
52
timidly submitted to the unjust demands of England.
The Cabinet discussion
ended on December 26, 1861 in a unanimous agreement upon the letter of reply
which Seward had prepared.

52 Bates, 216.

•
CHAPTER VI

SEVVARD'S NOTE
In preparing the note Seward undoubtedly had many things to consider.
The United States government was to be allowed no opportuhity far a full
statement of the facts or to present its own views of the right to make the
capture.

Behind the demand was the instruction to Lord Lyons to leave

Washington within a week if the United States failed to comply with the
British ter.ms;

1

there was the hurrying of several thousand troops to Canada

and the hasty fortification of the frontier of those provinces; and lastly
the evasive answer Lord Lyons should return, if he were asked what would be
the consequences of a refusal to surrender the prisoners.

2

These things

all foretold what the consequence would be, if any attempt were made by the
Unit~d

States to maintain the seizure on the principles of international

law as determined by British precedents and practice.
instant war.

It meant simply

This would be a struggle in which England would be actuated

by motives of selfish policy in a much greater degree than by the principle
that she was pretending to uphold and defend.

1 Newton, I, 65.

2

~.,

I, 66.
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L

The weavers of Lancashire,

76
at that time", were beginning to suffer from a cotton famine, and there was
such impatience from that quarter on account of the continuance of the Civil
War. 3 To the United states, on the other hand, such a war meant the loss of
everything. 4 This vlould include the transfer of the Federal armies to the
northern frontier,5

the raising of the blockade, the ravaging of unprotecte

coasts, the bombardment and blockade of seacoast cities, a probable inva.
6
sion of the northern states by British troops from Canada, and an alliance
between England and the Confederacy which would probably result in establishing the independence of the latter. 7 It was necessary to bear all these
things in mind while considering the British demand.

It may be assumed

with confidence that the perils of a conflict with Great Britain, as was
emphasized by the advice of Bright, Cobden, Adams, Weed, Bigelow, and Dayton
was the chief factor in Seward 1s conclusions.
Seward evidently did not expect Great Britain to take such a serious
stand in regard to the matter.

It had been his belief that the British
8
government would not want the prisoners.
He said on a later occasion

that Lord Lyons1 communication was his first knowledge that the British

3 Donn Piatt, Memories of Men Who Saved the Union, Belford, Clarke,
New York, 1887, 165.

4

Bates, 214.

5 Ibid. , 215.
6 Ibidl, 215.
7

lliS!. , 215.

8 Welles, 186.

Hereafter this vwrk will be cited as Piatt.
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governm~

proposed to make it a

~uestion

of insult and of war.9

The President and Cabinet having agreed to surrender the Confederate
commissioners, Secretary Seward's reply to the British demand was sent to
Lord Lyons.

The communication was quite long and began by making a careful
10
statement of the contents of Russe11 t s note of November 30, 1861.
Seward

then stated that the capture was, made without any direction, instruction,
or even foreknowledge of the Federal government.

It also mentioned that no

orders had been issued to Captain Wilkes or any naval officer to arrest
the four persons taken from the Trent, or any other British ship.

Thus,

the British government would infer from these facts that the United states
had no purpose or even thought of forcing into discussion the question that
had arisen.
The facts concerning the boarding of the

~

as reported by Commander

Williams of the British Navy were then reviewed by Seward and the supposed
11
fictions pointed out.
Seward reminded Russell that in his correspondence he had omitted the
facts that at the time of the seizure, an insurrection was existing in the
United States which this

government was engaged in suppressing by the

emplyment of land and naval forces, and that in regard to this domestic
strife the United States considered Great Britain as a friendly power, while

9 Weed, II, 415.

10 Official Records, 1145.
11. Ibid., 1146.
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she had assumed
for herself the attitude of a neutral •
...

12

Next, it was mentioned that Great Britain and the United States recognized the two articles of the Declaration of Paris in 1856, that the
neutral or friendly flag should cover an enemy's goods not contraband of
war, and that neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to
capture under any enemy's flag.

"These exceptions of contraband from

favour were a negative acceptance by the parties of the rule ••• everywhere
recognized as a part of the law of nations that whatever is contraband '
is liable to capture and confiscation in all cases.,,13
The character and purposes of the persons seized were then carefully
explained, and the statement ma,de that it was to be presumed that the
commissioners bore dispatches which it appeared from information sent by
the American Minister at Paris had escaped the search of the Trent, and
reached England in safety.14 Seward also stated that the agent and officers
of the Trent, including Commander Williams, before leaving Havana knew that
Mason and Slidell were commissioners from the Confederate States on their
15
way to Europe.
From the above facts Secretary Seward arrived at the
16
conclusion that the case was not an act of violence or outrage,
but only

12

~.,

1147.

13

~.,

1147.

14

!£M., 1147.

15

~.,

1147.

16

~.,

1148.
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an ordinary.and legal belligerent proceeding against a neutral vessel
carrying contraband of war for the use and benefit of the insurgents; that
the question was whether this had been done in accordance with the law of
nations; and that the following inquiries were involved:
1) Were the persons named and their supposed
despatches contraband of war?
2) Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and
search the Trent for these contraband persons
and despatches?
3) Did he exercise that right in a lawful
and proper meaning?
4) Having found the contraband persons on
board and in presumed possession of the contraband despatches, had he a right to capture the
persons?
5) Did he exercise that right of capture
in the manner allowed and recognized by the
law of nations?17
It was then stated that i f these questions should be answered in the
affirmative, the British government would ha.ve no claim for reparation.
An affirmative conclusion was reached in the case of the first four
18
questions.
Seward remarked ttat "maritime law is clear as to the dis-

position to be made of captured contraband vessels and property, but it
says nothing c one erning the mode of procedure in regard to contraband
persons.,,19 Regret was expressed that maritime systems of law furnished
no better processes of determining the characters of contraband persons.

17

~.,

1148.

18

~.,

1149.

19 Ibid., 1149.

So
Seward thought all unprejudiced minds would agree that, it would be
better to follow the existing judicial remedy than to adopt the idea of
leaving the decision with the captor and relying upon diplomatic debates
to review his decision.

It was practically Ita choice between law, with

its imperfections and delays, and war with its evils and desolations. 1I20
The Secretary next reviewed the course of Wilkes in making a prize

.

of the Trent and capturing the contraband persons lawfully, then permitting
her to continue upon her voyage, instead of sending her into port for adjUdication.

21

The capture was incomplete, if the whole thing constituted

a single transaction.

It was unfinished or abandoned.

Whether the leaving

of the act unfinished was voluntary or not, was the question which was to
determine the validity of the British claim for reparation. 22 If necessary,
and therefore involuntary, the British claim for reparation would be unfounded; ,if unnecessary and involuntary then the claim was well founded.
At this point Seward reviewed Wilkes' reasons for not carrying the
Trent into port.

The first reason wa.s on account of his being so reduced

in officers and crew,23 and the second was the inconvenience, loss, and
disappointment which would have resulted to the passengers of the vessel.
The United States could not disavow such humane motives, but it did not
occur to Wilkes that such a course might sacrifice the right of the government to retain the captured persons, although he was not deserving of
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censure for al't',Ything that he had done.
justified to his

The question was not whether he was

but what.the view of his government was as to
24
the effect of his course in not bringing the ~ into port.
It would
gove~ent,

have been entirely involuntary if made solely upon the ground that Wilkes
could not bring the prize vessel into port on account of a lack of officers
and crew necessary to do so.

Neithe~

is a large prize crew necessary for

it is the duty of the captured party to assent and go willingly before the
25
judicial tribunal which tries the case.
Should the captured party express
a determination to use force which there is no reasonable probability of
the captor's overcoming without too much risk to himself, he may properly
,leave the prize vessel to proceed on her voyage and it cannot afterward be
objected that she has been deprived of the judicial remedy which was her
due.

Because Wilkes' second reason was different from the first, Seward

came to the conclusion that the release of the Trent was not made of necessi
26
and was therefore voluntary.
Seward disclaimed that any deliberate wrong in the transaction had
~
27
been meditated or approved.
He remarked that what had happened was simply
an inadvertency from a rule uncertainly established.

He believed that for

this error, Great Britain had a right to expect the same reparation that we

,
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would expect in a similar case.

•

Seward very capably stated that he was

not aware that in examining this question he seems to be taking the British
side against his own country, but again he discovered that was really defending an old honored, and cherished American cause.

He mentioned that

these principles had been "laid down for us in 1804 by James Madison, when
Secretary of State ••• in instructions given to James Monroe, our Minister
28
to England. 1I
A quotation was then inserted from one of Madison's despatches, in
which he said that a belligerent commander is not permitted to condemn
and seize on the deck of a neutral vessel, property suspected of being
contraband, but -that the whole matter must be submitted to a prize court
which can assess damages against the captor for an abuse of his power;
hence it is unreas'onable, unjust and inhuman to permit a naval officer
restricted in the case of mere property of trivial amount to decide, on
the deck of his vessel without any sort of trial, the question of allegiance
and carry such decision into effect by forcing every individual he may
choose into a service of detestable and humiliating to the impressed seaman
29
and dangerous again to life itself.
Seward expressed satisfaction at being able to decide the case upon
strictly American principles, and the statement made that the claim of the

28 Ibid., 1153.
29

Ibid., 1154.

British g~ernment had not been made in a discourteous manner. 30
He believed that it was the duty of the American government to disavow
Wilkes' act and return the prisoners.

Seward very capably stated for the

benefit of Great Britain:
If the safety of this Union required the
detention of the captured persons, it would be
the right and duty of tRis government to detain them. But the effectual check and waning
proportions of the existing insurrection, as
well as the C0ID.9ari ti ve unimportance of the
captured persons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, happily forbid me from resorting
to this defense ••• 31
Seward again called attention to the fact that Great Britain had often
refused to yield claims like the one under consideration, and it was
thought a matter of special congratulation that the British government had
disavowed its former principles and was now contending for what the United
States had always insisted upon.

.32

The Secretary closed this very important

note by saying that the seized persons being held in custody would be cheerfully liberated.

"lour lordship will please indicate a time and place for

receiving them. 1/33
This was the reply of William H. Se.ward which was also the reply of the
United States government conceding to the British demand.

30 Ibid., 1154.

31 Ibid., 1154.
32

~.,

1154 •

.33 Ibid., 1154.

The entire

------------------------.........
84
comm.unicati~

conveys the idea to the reader that it was prepared for the

purpose of finding diplomatic reasons for the surrender of the Confederate
Commissioners. 34 In considering the worthiness of such a note, it must be
remembered that Seward's answer was prepared at a time of national crisis
and also on brief notice.

It was necessary for Seward to persuade a Presi-

dent who wished to dispose of the affair in a different manner.

The

reluctant members,of a divided Cabinet were to be conciliated and unified.
Captain Wilkes who had become a naval idol had to be justified and supported.
Congress also had to be pacified because of its actions after the disclosure
of the capture.
position.

35

Seward was indeed placed in a delicate and complicated

At the same time that he yielded to Britain's demand, he justi-

fied the spirit of Wilkes' act and was able to place the surrender solely
upon a simple mistake, an error made out of humane considerations and
consequently one which was not deserving of censure.

By showing that in

making the surreooer" he was guided by long cherished American principles"
he held back the censure and objections which were certain to come from
the United States.
This paper was highly characteristic of Seward because as his biographers suggest" he was at last given the opportunity to save his nation at
a time of national crisis.

34

His answer was written in that careless and

The full contents of this despatch may also be found in William H. Seward
Works" V, 295 to 309.

35 Bancroft" II" 239.
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confident att.;itude that so characterized his correspondence.

He smoothed

over the places which were most antagonistic to Great Britain and elaborated
upon the points where he was on safe ground.

The note was intermittently

dotted with crafty implications or plausible assumptions.
Seward made a few comments on his reply to Lord Lyons.

1I
1

In a letter of

December 27, 1861 to Adams, Seward maintained that the United states as
always have vindicated their consistency, prinCiples, and poliCY, while
"measuring out to Great Britain, the justice which they have always claimed
at her hands. n36

On December 27th, he also wrote a letter to Thurlow Weed

mentioning that when lVeed would read the reply he would know who wrote it.
He also mentioned that Weed would have to shield him from reproaches as he
37
had so ably done in England.
Seward told Weed that it was necessary to
consult the tempers of people in the United states as well as in England,
and that if he had been as tame as Weed suggested, "I should have had no
standing of my own. 1I38 A few years later, Seward while on a visit to
General Grant's headquarters

gav~

his reasons for the release of Mason and

Slidell.

He said that the books on international law gave no clue as how
39
the subject should be handled.
It was decided to release the prisoners
rather than become embroiled in a war with Great Britain and possibly France.

36

Official Records, 1143.

37

FrederiCk W. Seward, Life and Le:bters, III, 34.

38 ~., III, 46.
39

Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant, Century Company, New York, 1897,
253. Hereafter this vvork will be cited as Porter.
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He knew that.it was the desire of the Confederacy to have the United states
become embroiled in a foreign war, and thus he decided to prevent assistance
from abroad. 40
Lincoln while conferrins with Grant in 1864 said that during the trying
days before the settlement, Seward studied the various works on international
law, and "came to Cabinet meetings loaded to the muzzle with the subject.,,41

On December 27, 1861, Lord

~ons

acknowledged receipt of Seward's note

to Commander Hewett of the English boat, Rinaldo, directing him to proceed
at once with his vessel to Provincetown, Massachusetts, and receive the
42
released prisoners.

On January 10, 1862, Lord Russell addressed a note to Lord Lyons stating
that the British government had carefully considered how far Seward's note
and its concessions complied with the British demand and arrived at the

conclusion that they constitute the reparation which the British nation
43
had a right to expect.
He also stated that the British government differe
44
with Seward on s cme of the conclusions at which he arrived.
In his reply of January 23, 1862, to Seward, written after the release
of the prisoners, Russell denied that ambassadors were contraband of war

40

~.,

254.

41 Ibid. , 408, quoting Lincoln.
42 state Papers, 647.
43
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i

subjecting tqe vessel to seizure. 45 Seward, as has been stated, had maintained the contrary.

The case therefore leaves that question exactly as

it was before.
The surrenier of the prisoners being placed upon the well settled
rule, that a captor cannot take out a prize either persons or property
as contraband without bringing in the vessel for adjudication, unless
he is necessarily prevented from so doing, the decision settled in this
respect no new principle of international law.

But Lord Russell persisted

in his original contention, that a belligerent cannot on any pretense take
46
thus not merely admitting but insisting
persons out of a neutral vessel,
on what w'e as a nation had claimed for years; this doctrine, therefore, for
which we had so long contended in vain, must now be considered an established rule of international law.
Several conclusions are apparent from a careful examination of the
subject.

British conservatives who feared the influence of democratic

liberals like Cobden and Bright, rejoiced when the United states seemed
to fail in the early years of the Civil War.
"Seward's great responsibility as Secretary of state was to prevent
the recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain and France.,,47 To

45

state Papers, 650.

46 Ibid., 651.
47 Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet, Little, Brown, and Company,
Boston, 1946, 209. Hereafter this work will be referred to as Hendrick.
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prevent this recognition Seward implanted the idea in the minds of the
•
French and British leaders that recognition of the Confederacy meant war
with the United States.

This was how he prevented intervention because he

knew that Great Britain did not desire war with the United states at this
time.

Lyons and Russell believed that Seward desired a foreign w'ar as a

way out of the nation's difficulties.

As a result of this infonnation,

his rants and rages against Great Britain take on a new importance.

Thus

Seward accomplished his aim and carried out his responsibility not because
he was an authority on international law, which he was not, "but because
he understood human nature. II 48The Trent case proved tha. t it is not lawful on the high seas to take
persons, whatever their character, as prisoners out of a neutral ship which
has not been judicially proved to have forfeited the benefit of her neutral
character.
The four dates most necessary to bear in mind while studying this
subject are the 16th of November, 1861, when the news of the seizure
reached Europe; the 12th of December, 1861, when'the extreme seriousness
of tl)e situation dawned on the American mind through tidings of the British
excitement and consequent demands; and, finally, the 18th of December, 1861,
when it became apparent that a decision as to the course to be pursued had
to be reached within one week by the United states government.
By

48

his method of presentation in the note Seward put England on the

~.,

210.
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ground of insisting on the rights of neutrals, a matter to which in the

...

past Americans had sometimes thought England indifferent.

He also placed

the United states in the proper position regarding her previous utterances
tOliards the rights of neutrals, and at the same time placed the United
states in accord with Europe.
The United states lost a wonderful opportunity by ignoring the advice
of Montgomery Blair.

.

The position advised by Blair would have indicated

the confidence we felt in our national power, and the contempt in which
we held both those whom we called "rebels" and those whom they termed their
envoys.

It would have established our prestige in'the eyes of foreign

nations.
Sound reasons were not given for the surrender of Mason and. Slidell
by Seward.

According to James G. Blaine, the doctrine announced by Seward

, sould not be held on sound principles of international law, and he believed
that we did not place the restoration of the prisoners upon true ground,
viz., "that their seizure was in Violation of the principles vthich we could
not abandon either for a temporary advantage or to save the wounding of
49
our national pride."
Seward's handling of the case as he did, yielded no point of international law on which we might at any time desire to rest a claim as

49 James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress, Bell Company, Norwich,
Connecticut, 1884, I, 585.
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1

belligerenti., but made the decision depend on a doctrine and practice
universally recognized in modern civilized warfare as the only mode of
treating a prize.

50

The note gave due credit to Wilkes for all the quali-

ties which we wished our naval officers to cultivate, and only indirectly
51
criticized his leniency.
It appeared to follow the doubts suggested
by Welles as to the possible consequences of Wilkes' failure to bring in
52
.
the ~.
It showed that the government had from the outset been
conscious of the weak point of the case.

His wording was meant to convey

the impression that he reached the same conclusions as the British lawyers
1

.~

which would undoubtedly weaken any criticism from Great Britain.

Through

this surrender because of United states principles, Mason and Slidell were
to become Britain's "white elephants u •
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